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Abstract—We consider that at every instant each member of
a population, which we refer to as an agent, selects one strategy
out of a finite set. The agents are nondescript, and their strategy
choices are described by the so-called population state vector,
whose entries are the portions of the population selecting each
strategy. Likewise, each entry of the so-called payoff vector
is the reward attributed to a strategy. We consider that a
finite-dimensional nonlinear dynamical system, denoted as payoff
dynamics model (PDM), specifies a mechanism that determines
the payoff as a causal map of the population state. A bounded-
rationality protocol, which is often inspired on evolutionary
biology principles, governs how each agent continually revises
its strategy based on complete or partial knowledge of the popu-
lation state and payoff. The population is protocol-homogeneous
but is otherwise strategy-heterogeneous considering that the
agents are allowed to select distinct strategies concurrently. A
stochastic mechanism determines the instants when agents revise
their strategies, but we consider that the population is large
enough that, with high probability, the population state can be
approximated with arbitrary accuracy uniformly over any finite
horizon by a so-called (deterministic) mean population state. We
propose an approach that takes advantage of passivity principles
to obtain sufficient conditions determining, for a given protocol
and PDM, when the mean population state is guaranteed to
converge to a meaningful set of equilibria, which could be either
an appropriately defined extension of Nash’s for the PDM or a
perturbed version of it. By generalizing and unifying previous
work, our framework also provides a foundation for future
work. We specialize our results for well-known protocols and
a class of PDM that includes as particular cases the payoff
mechanisms proposed in previous work to model learning, inertia,
and anticipation.
Index Terms—Population games, game theory, passivity, Nash
equilibrium, evolutionary dynamics, Lyapunov stability, opti-
mization
I. INTRODUCTION
We report on a theoretical framework and analytic methods
to determine the time-evolution of the strategy choices, out
of a finite set with n elements, by the members of a large
population in response to a payoff mechanism. Although we
assume that there is a single population, the techniques and
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methods put forth in this article can be readily adapted to the
multi-population case.
We adopt the evolutionary dynamic paradigm well-
documented in [1]–[3] according to which the members of
the population, which we call agents, repeatedly revise their
strategy choices according to a given mechanism modeled
by a so-called revision protocol (protocol for short). The
population is protocol-homogeneous because all of its agents
follow the same revision mechanism, but is otherwise strategy-
heterogeneous considering that the agents are allowed to con-
currently select distinct strategies. Although mixed strategies
are not allowed as each agent chooses exactly one strategy at
every instant, the protocol may be probabilistic when the revi-
sion mechanism involves randomization. The identity of each
agent is unimportant, and consequently all the information that
is relevant, at any given instant, is encapsulated in the so-called
population state vector whose entries quantify the portions of
the population adopting each strategy. Henceforth, we refer to
the set of all possible population states, or equivalently the
state space, as the strategy profile set. Hence, every strategy
profile is a vector with n nonnegative entries adding up to the
so-called population mass m.
In most related prior work, a so-called population game [4]
determines at any given instant the n-dimensional payoff vec-
tor, which quantifies the reward associated with each strategy,
as a function of the population state. A population game
may represent a pricing scheme that is implemented by a
coordinator, or it may model a payoff mechanism resulting
from the interactions among the agents and with the envi-
ronment. Examples include congestion population games for
traffic assignment [5], [6] and others, such as with wars of
attrition [7], that are obtained by matching of a stage normal-
form game. The set of Nash equilibria of a population game
can be functionally defined in the usual way, and may be
interpreted in the mass-action sense discussed in [8], which
was originally suggested in [9].
A. Population games, protocols and stability
Our work focuses on the protocol classes surveyed in [2],
[3], which are inspired, to a great extent, on elementary
bounded rationality mechanisms of evolutionary biology [10].
As is explained in [2, § 2.3] and [11], the protocol models
how much each agent knows about the payoff vector and
the population state, and how it uses the available informa-
tion to revise its strategy. Consequently, under the widely-
used assumption that agents revise their strategies at times
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2determined by a Poisson process, the resulting population
state can be viewed as the Markov process associated with
the system formed by the feedback interconnection between
the evolutionary dynamics specified by the protocol and the
population game. The analysis in [12], which shows that the
evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) characterized in [13]
are local attractors for the expectation of the population
state, motivated the subsequent early work summarized in [4]
exploring a Markovian approach to establish in a probabilistic
sense that in the long run the population state remains near,
and in some cases converges to, certain Nash equilibria. Fur-
thermore, the concept of stochastically stable set was defined
and characterized in [14] to account for the effect of persistent
stochastic perturbations and [15] extended these notions to
examine equilibrium selection.
B. Mean population sate and deterministic payoff
In this article, we consider the case in which the population
size is large enough that Khinchin’s law of large numbers can
be invoked to conclude that realizations of the population state
at each instant will remain close to its expected value with
high probability. This justifies our decision to focus on the
so-called mean population state, which akin to the approach
in [12] represents the expectation of the population state that
can be obtained as the deterministic solution of a system of
ordinary differential equations.
Likewise, we restrict our analysis to deterministic payoffs
that are obtained in terms of the mean population state accord-
ing to a soon to be described payoff dynamics model (PDM)
of which population games are a particular case. As we argue
precisely in § V, the deterministic payoff will approximate
the payoff of an associated finite population formulation with
increasing fidelity as the size of the population tends to infinity.
1) Nash equilibria of population games and long term
behavior of the mean population state: Before we outline our
main contributions, we proceed to surveying a few existing
concepts and convergence results for the particular case in
which a population game governs the deterministic payoff.
In this context, the set of ordinary differential equations
governing the mean population state, and consequently also
the payoff, is commonly referred to as mean dynamics.
As is discussed in [16] for a general class of protocols and
population games, and further refined in [17], results in [18]
guarantee that the mean population state approximates the
population state with arbitrary accuracy uniformly over any
given finite time horizon with probability approaching one as
the number of agents tends to infinity, which highlights the
importance of analyzing the long-term evolution of the mean
population state and characterizing the associated globally
attracting sets. Notably, the time horizon in the uniform ap-
proximation results reported in [16], [17] can be selected large
enough to guarantee that with high probability the population
state of a sufficiently large population will tend to the smallest
globally attractive set. As noted in [4], this conclusion has
special relevance when a subset of Nash equilibria is globally
attractive. It demonstrates the interesting fact that, even though
the agents follow simple bounded rationality protocols that
do not require knowledge of the structure of the population
game, the population is still capable of self-organizing in a way
that the population state tends to a subset of Nash equilibria.
This not only reinforces the importance of the mass-action
interpretation of Nash equilibria, but it also justifies regarding
the globally attractive subsets of Nash equilibria as reliable
predictors of the long term behavior of the population.
In many cases of interest it is possible to construct a
Lyapunov function [19] establishing that the entire set of
Nash equilibria is globally asymptotically stable and hence
also attractive. The historical perspective and analysis in [20]
popularized and fostered very significant work that uses the
Lyapunov approach in conjunction with the positive corre-
lation and Nash stationarity concepts, which are particularly
insightful in the context of evolutionary dynamics, to establish
global attractivity or, in same cases, global asymptotic stability
of the Nash equilibrium set for widely-used protocols and
population game classes, such as potential [21], [22] and
contractive1 games [24]. Of key importance in [21], [24] is the
fact that, for a given constant payoff, the mean population state
governed by a Nash stationary protocol is also constant if and
only if it is a best response, which establishes an equivalence
between the rest points of the mean dynamics and the Nash
equilibria of the population game. The concepts of Nash
stationarity and positive correlation are also explained in detail
in [2, Chapter 5], where they are viewed as properties of the
deterministic mean dynamics associated with each protocol.
Instead, here we adopt the convention, which will be useful
later on, of viewing Nash stationarity and positive correlation
as properties of the protocol.
The Theorems [2, 12.B.3] and [2, 12.B.5], which are derived
from work in [25] and [26], offer yet another rationale asso-
ciating a globally asymptotically stable set of equilibria of the
mean dynamics, when one exists, with the long term behavior
of the population state for large populations. More specifically,
these results ascertain under unrestrictive conditions that the
measure, with respect to the stationary distribution of the
population state, tends to one within any open set containing
a globally asymptotically stable set as the population size
tends to infinity. This implies that as the population grows,
the stationary distribution of the population state tends to
concentrate around the smallest globally asymptotically stable
set.
C. Outline of main contributions
From a dynamical systems theory perspective [19], [27], a
population game would be qualified as memoryless because it
acts as an instantaneous map from the mean population state
to the deterministic payoff vector. Consequently, population
games cannot capture dynamics in the payoff mechanism such
as when there is inertia or anticipation effects in the agents’
perception of the reward for each strategy.
The following are the main contributions of this article:
1This class of population games is also referred to as “stable” in [23].
Following the recent naming convention in [1], we prefer to use the qual-
ifier “contractive” to avoid confusion with other concepts of stability used
throughout the article. Similarly, we will use “strictly contractive” to qualify
a population game that would be “strictly stable” according to [23].
3(i) In § II-A, we propose a class of payoff dynamics models
(PDM) that includes as particular cases the dynamically
modified payoffs analyzed in [28], of which the so-
called smoothed and anticipatory payoff modifications
modeling inertia and anticipatory effects, respectively, are
examples. According to our formulation, each PDM is
associated with a so-called stationary population game
that determines the deterministic payoff in the stationary
regime characterized by when the mean population state
converges as time tends to infinity.
(ii) Given a PDM and a protocol satisfying Nash stationarity,
in § VII we provide sufficient conditions determining
when the set of Nash equilibria of the stationary pop-
ulation game is either globally asymptotically stable or
globally attractive. We also specialize our results for the
classes of integrable excess payoff target and impartial
pairwise comparison protocols, of which the Brown-von
Neumann-Nash and Smith protocols are, respectively,
well-known examples.
(iii) In § VIII, we obtain sufficient conditions similar to
those in (ii) for perturbed best response protocols, for
which Nash stationarity does not hold. In this case, the
conditions determine when a perturbed equilibrium set,
which can be viewed as an approximation of Nash’s, is
either globally asymptotic stable or globally attractive.
(iv) In § IX, we determine the parameters of a PDM class,
whereof the smoothed and anticipatory dynamically mod-
ified payoff considered in [28] are particular cases, under
which the sufficient conditions outlined (i) and (ii) are
satisfied. This includes cases in which the stationary
population game is either affine, but unlike what is
assumed in [28] may not be strictly contractive, or has a
strictly concave potential.
1) Outline of our technical approach: We establish the
results in (i) - (iv) by recognizing that in our paradigm
the mean population state and the deterministic payoff are
governed by the mean closed loop model, which is precisely
defined in § II-C as the feedback interconnection between the
PDM and the so-called evolutionary dynamics model (EDM)
that captures the strategy revision dynamics as specified by
the protocol.
As we discussed in § I-B1 for the case in which the payoff
is determined by a population game, Lyapunov functions [19]
are often used to establish convergence towards certain equi-
libria of the mean dynamics. The typical argument follows
techniques derived from the classical principles in [29]. How-
ever, these techniques are not immediately applicable to our
formulation because the deterministic payoff is no longer a
memoryless function of the mean population state, which can
no longer be characterized as a solution of the mean dynamics.
Instead we resort to a well-known compositional approach [30]
rooted on passivity principles with which convergence prop-
erties for the mean closed loop model can be ascertained by
separately establishing certain passivity properties of the EDM
and the PDM. More specifically, the search for a Lyapunov
function, which was central for establishing convergence to
equilibria of the mean dynamics, is superseded in our context
by the construction of certain types of storage functions for
the EDM and the PDM.
Although the aforementioned passivity-based methodology,
including the construction of storage functions for the individ-
ual blocks of a feedback loop to ascertain its stability [31],
has been widely used [32], we propose our own form of
passivity inspired on the approach in [28], which is both
equilibrium independent and is compatible with the EDM and
PDM classes we are interested in. In § VI we introduce the
passivity concepts used throughout the article. It includes in
§ VI-D a comparison with the related concepts of equilibrium
independent passivity [30], differential passivity [33], [34] and
incremental passivity [35].
Most of the key results presented here date back to [36], and
preliminary versions of the results in this article were reported
in [37], [38].
D. Structure of the article
Besides the introduction, the article has eight sections briefly
described as follows:
• In §II we start by describing key preliminary concepts,
including the detailed definitions of PDM, EDM and the
mean closed loop model. The section concludes with
an overarching problem formulation that motivates the
results derived throughout the paper.
• The examples discussed in §III illustrate applications of
particular instances of the framework considered here -
such as when the PDM is a population game and the
EDM is based on replicator mechanisms - to engineering
problems.
• In §IV we provide a comparison among evolutionary
games, population games - which we generalize here -
and mean field games.
• Using an explicit finite population framework, in §V we
ascertain that the mean population state and deterministic
payoff resulting from solutions of the mean closed loop
model indeed approximate the population state and the
payoff with arbitrary fidelity over any finite time horizon
uniformly, as the number of agents tends to infinity.
• In §VI we introduce the main concepts used throughout
the article to characterize relevant passivity properties
for any given PDM and EDM. More specifically, we
define δ-passivity allowing a possible surplus and δ-
antipassivity admitting a possible deficit for an EDM
and PDM, respectively. A weak version of δ-antipassivity
is also proposed and invoked in Lemma 1 to ascertain
sufficient conditions that will be used in § VII and § VIII
to establish global attractivity results.
• A detailed analysis in §VII for the case in which the EDM
satisfies Nash stationarity leads to methods to determine
whether the set of Nash equilibria of the stationary game
associated with a given PDM is globally attractive or
globally asymptotically stable. We also specialize our
results for the integrable excess payoff target (EPT) and
impartial pairwise comparison (IPC) protocols.
• In §VIII we present results that are analog to § V for
perturbed best response (PBR) protocols. In addition, we
4establish a fundamental trade-off according to which a
perturbed equilibria set is globally attractive even when
the PDM has a δ-antipassivity deficit provided that it is
no larger than the δ-passivity surplus of the EDM. This
trade-off is not possible in the context of § V because,
as is shown in [38, Corollary IV.3], any EDM stemming
from an EPT or IPC protocol never have a positive δ-
passivity surplus.
• In §IX we propose the so-called smoothing-anticipatory
PDM class and characterize its δ-antipassivity proper-
ties. We also include examples illustrating how the δ-
antipassive properties of the aforementioned PDM can
be used in conjunction with the results in § IV or § V
to establish global stability of the Nash equilibria of the
stationary game or a perturbed version, respectively.
II. PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION
Before we specify the class of problems considered through-
out this article, we proceed to defining and discussing basic
properties of the sets and maps needed for our analysis.
In § II-A, we will propose a class of payoff dynamics models
(PDM) comprising a state that evolves in (continuous) non-
negative real-valued time T = R+. In our single-population
framework, the strategy profile set is specified as follows:
X def=
z ∈ Rn+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
zj = m

where n is the number of strategies and m is the population
mass. Every element of X is interpreted as a n-tuple repre-
senting the portions of the population adopting each strategy.
For any vector r in Rn, we specify the following norm:
‖r‖ def= max
1≤i≤n
|ri|
For any trajectory v : T→ Rn, we adopt the following norm
‖v‖ def= sup
t∈T
‖v(t)‖
We restrict our analysis to trajectories in the following set:
Rn
def
= {All differentiable maps from T to Rn}
Definition 1. We reserve x : T→ X to denote the so-called
mean population state trajectory. At a particular time t the
mean population state is represented by x(t). The set of
admissible mean population state trajectories X is defined as
follows:
X
def
=
{
x ∈ Rn ∣∣ ‖x˙‖ <∞ and x(τ) ∈ X, τ ∈ T}
Definition 2. We use p : T→ Rn to denote the so-called
deterministic payoff trajectory. The deterministic payoff at time
t is represented by p(t), whose entries ascribe a reward to each
strategy. The set of possible deterministic payoff trajectories
P is specified as:
P
def
=
{
p ∈ Rn ∣∣ ‖p‖ <∞ and ‖p˙‖ <∞}
In § V, we describe a scenario in which the mean population
state and deterministic payoff are high fidelity approximations
of the population state and payoff of a finite population,
respectively, provided that the number of agents is sufficiently
large.
We now proceed with defining the main models and con-
cepts needed to complete the description of our framework.
A. Payoff Dynamics Model (PDM)
We start by defining population games as used in the
framework described in § I-A.
Definition 3. (Population game) A population game is spec-
ified by a continuous map F : X → Rn. It determines the
deterministic payoff trajectory as p(t) = F(x(t)), for t ≥ 0.
In contrast with the population game formulation in which
p is obtained via a memoryless2 map of x, we consider that a
payoff dynamics model (PDM), as defined below, governs the
deterministic payoff trajectory in terms of the mean population
state trajectory.
Definition 4. (PDM) We consider that a payoff dynamics
model (PDM) is defined as follows:
q˙(t) = G(q(t), u(t))
p(t) = H(q(t), u(t)), t ≥ 0, q(0) ∈ Rn, u ∈ X (1)
where G : Rn × X → Rn is Lipschitz continuous and
H : Rn × X→ Rn is continuously differentiable and Lipschitz
continuous. The state-space representation (1) specifies a map
from the input u and the initial condition q(0) to the state
q and output p. Henceforth, we identify a PDM by the pair
(G,H) that specifies it.
The PDM is a finite-dimensional dynamical system that,
as we will see in § II-C, will be used in a closed loop
configuration in which u is set to the mean population state
trajectory x.
In addition, we require that the PDM satisfies the following
assumption for reasons that will become clear in Proposition 1.
Assumption 1. (PDM Boundedness) In this article we con-
sider that every PDM is a bounded map in the following sense:
sup
u∈X
‖q‖ <∞, q(0) ∈ Rn (2)
where q is the solution of (1) for input u and initial condi-
tion q(0).
Remark 1. Boundedness of a PDM guarantees that for each
initial condition q(0) in Rn there is a finite upper-bound for
‖q‖ that holds for all inputs u in X. In addition, because G
is Lipschitz continuous, H is continuously differentiable, and
the elements of X are bounded, we infer that if the PDM is
bounded then p, q˙, and p˙ are also bounded, for each initial
condition q(0).
2Here we adopt a convention that is common in systems theory, according
to which a system is called memoryless when the output is an instantaneous
(point-wise in time) function of the input.
5We also assume that every PDM is associated with a so-
called stationary population game according to the following
assumption.
Assumption 2. (Stationary Population Game of a PDM)
In this article, we assume that for every PDM there is
a continuous map F¯ : X → Rn for which the following
implication holds for any initial condition q(0) in Rn:
lim
t→∞ ‖u˙(t)‖ = 0 =⇒ limt→∞
∥∥p(t)− F¯(u(t))∥∥ = 0, u ∈ X
(3)
in addition, we require that the following set{
(z, s) ∈ X× Rn ∣∣H(z, s) = F¯(z)}
is either a compact subset of or the entire set X × Rn. We
refer to F¯ as the stationary population game of the PDM.
The following definition clarifies the way in which popula-
tion games can be regarded as a particular PDM class.
Definition 5. (Memoryless PDM) Let F : X → Rn be
a continuously differentiable3 map that defines a population
game. We refer to F interchangeably as a population game
or a memoryless PDM.
It suffices to choose H(s, z) = F(z) and, although it is
not necessary, adopt G(s, z) = F(z)− s to conclude that the
memoryless PDM complies with Definition 4. It also follows
immediately from this construct that the stationary population
game F¯ is F .
Definition 6. Given a PDM, the set of Nash equilibria of its
stationary population game is defined as follows:
NE(F¯) def= {z ∈ X ∣∣ zT F¯(z) ≥ z¯T F¯(z), z¯ ∈ X}
If a PDM is memoryless then NE(F¯) is the Nash equilibria
set of the underlying population game F .
The results in this article are valid for any PDM satisfying
the assumptions above, and in § VI-B1 and § IX, we define
and analyze in more detail two cases of interest.
B. Evolutionary Dynamics Model (EDM)
Our model for how the state of the population evolves over
time is specified as follows.
Definition 7. (EDM) The evolutionary dynamics of the popu-
lation is specified by an evolutionary dynamics model (EDM)
of the following form:
x˙(t) = V(x(t), w(t)), x(0) ∈ X, t ≥ 0, w ∈ P (4)
where V : X×Rn → Rn is a given Lipschitz continuous map
that also satisfies the following constraint:
V(z, r) ∈ TX(z), z ∈ X, r ∈ Rn (5)
where TX(z) is the cone of viable displacement from z
specified as:
TX(z) def=
{
α(z¯ − z) | z¯ ∈ X and α ≥ 0}, z ∈ X
3Notice that since X is compact, continuous differentiability of F implies
that it is also Lipschitz continuous.
n number of strategies.
m population mass.
Rn n-th dimensional real coordinate space.
Rn+ n-th dimensional nonnegative real coordinate space.
Rn− n-th dimensional nonpositive real coordinate space.
Rn∗ represents viable excess payoff vectors
(
Rn − int(Rn−)
)
.
X strategy profile set.
int(X) is defined as {z ∈ X | zi > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
bd(X) is given by X− int(X).
TABLE I
PARTIAL LIST OF BASIC NOTATION: PART I.
Here, x(t) is the state, which is also the output of the model,
x(0) is the initial condition, and w is the input that is typically
taken to be a given deterministic payoff trajectory.
Inspired by the notation in [2], we also represent the
subspace tangent to X as follows:
TX def=
{
z˜ ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
z˜i = 0
}
Remark 2. (“EDM” versus “mean dynamics”) We have
decided to use “evolutionary dynamics model”, or EDM,
to refer to (4) to distinguish it from the concept of “mean
dynamics” as defined in [2], which refers to a given map from
the set of population games to a certain class of differential
equations. The latter is not adequate for our formulation in
which we allow for a dynamical payoff mechanism described
by its own PDM.
In this article, we will consider a subclass of EDM that
stems from the following class of revision protocols.
Definition 8. (Protocol) A revision protocol, or proto-
col for short, is specified by a Lipschitz continuous map
T : Rn × X→ Rn×n+ . It models how members of the popula-
tion revise their strategies in response to the population state
and payoff. In particular, it determines the EDM as follows:
Vi(z, r) def=
n∑
j=1
zjTji(r, z)−
(
n∑
j=1
Tij(r, z)
)
zi,
z ∈ X, r ∈ Rn, 1 ≤ i ≤ n (6)
In § II-C, we model the feedback mechanism that is es-
tablished when the PDM is actually played by a population
characterized by a given protocol and corresponding EDM. We
also show in § V how the mean population state approximates
the population state of a population with arbitrary accuracy as
the number of agents tends to infinity.
Most of our basic notation is summarized in Tables I
and II, while most acronyms and notation associated with
EDM and PDM, some of which will be introduced later on,
are summarized in Table III.
C. Solutions of the Mean Closed Loop Model
We wish to study the trajectories of the deterministic payoff
and mean population state when the PDM is interconnected
in feedback with an EDM. That is to say that we consider
that the input of the PDM is the mean population state and,
in turn, the resulting deterministic payoff is the input of the
6F payoff map specifying a population game.
z represents a given strategy profile.
r represents a given payoff vector.
DF Jacobian of F
TX subspace tangent to X.
TX(z) cone tangent to X at z.
T nonnegative continuous time algebraically equivalent to R+.
X set of possible mean population state trajectories.
x mean population state trajectory.
P set of possible deterministic payoff trajectories.
p deterministic payoff trajectory.
TABLE II
PARTIAL LIST OF BASIC NOTATION: PART II.
PDM payoff dynamics model.
q state trajectory of the PDM.
G map specifying the differential equation for q.
H map specifying p based on q and input to the PDM.
F¯ stationary population game of a PDM.
NE(F¯) set of Nash equilibria of F¯ .
EDM evolutionary dynamics model.
V map specifying the differential equation modeling the EDM.
T protocol determining V .
EPT EDM associated with an excess payoff target protocol.
BNN (Brown-von Neumann-Nash) particular case of EPT EDM.
IPC EDM associated with impartial pairwise comparison protocol.
Smith particular case of IPC EDM.
PBR EDM associated with perturbed best response protocol.
Q perturbation map associated with the PBR EDM.
F˜ F¯ perturbed by Q as F˜(z) = F¯(z)−∇Q(z).
PE(F¯ ,Q) set of perturbed equilibria NE(F˜).
Logit particular case of PBR EDM.
TABLE III
PARTIAL LIST OF MOST ACRONYMS AND NOTATION ASSOCIATED WITH
PDM AND EDM.
EDM (see Fig. 1). A state-space closed loop model of this
feedback interconnection is constructed as follows.
Definition 9. (Mean Closed Loop Model) Given a PDM and
an EDM, the associated mean closed loop model is obtained
by using x as an input to (1) and p as an input to (4), or
equivalently, setting u = x and w = p. The following is the
state space representation of the mean closed loop model:
q˙(t) = G(q(t), x(t))
x˙(t) = VH(q(t), x(t))
p(t) = H(q(t), x(t)) , t ≥ 0,
(
q(0), x(0)
) ∈ Rn × X,
(7)
where VH : Rn × X→ Rn is defined as:
VH(s, z) def= V (z,H(s, z)) , s ∈ Rn, z ∈ X
Notice that the state of the mean closed loop model is(
q(t), x(t)
)
. The mean closed loop model has no input, and the
state trajectory (q, x) is the solution of the associated initial
value problem in response to the preselected initial condition(
q(0), x(0)
)
.
In § V, we show that solutions of (7) approximate uniformly,
over any finite time horizon, with arbitrary accuracy the
population state of a finite population subjected to the same
protocol and PDM with probability tending to one as the
number of agents tends to infinity.
It is clear from our PDM and EDM definitions that G and
VH are Lipschitz continuous, which, from Picard-Lindelo¨f
Theorem, guarantees the existence and uniqueness of solutions
Payoff Dynamics Model
q˙(t) = G (q(t), u(t))
p(t) = H (q(t), u(t)) (PDM)
q(0)
Evolutionary Dynamics Model
x˙(t) = V(x(t), w(t)) (EDM)
x(0)
p determ
inistic
payoff
(w = p)xm
ea
n
po
pu
la
tio
n
st
at
e (u = x)
Fig. 1. Diagram representing a feedback interconnection between a PDM and
an EDM. The resulting system is referred to as mean closed loop model.
of the initial value problem in (7). Also the boundedness of
the PDM from Assumption 1 and Remark 1 guarantees that p
and x remain in P and X, respectively. We assert these facts in
the following proposition, which is an immediate consequence
of the Picard-Lindelo¨f Theorem and Remark 1.
Proposition 1. Consider that a mean closed loop model (7)
is formed by an EDM and a PDM. For each initial condition(
q(0), x(0)
)
in Rn ×X there is a unique solution (q, x). The
solution is such that p and x are in P and X, respectively.
Furthermore, under the conditions of Proposition 1, an im-
mediate adaptation of the argument in [2, Theorem 4.A.3] can
be used to show that the map φt :
(
q(0), x(0)
) 7→ (q(t), x(t))
is Lipschitz continuous for any t in T.
D. Background on the Approach of [28]
As we discussed earlier, standard population games are
specified by a continuous map F : X → Rn that determines
the deterministic payoff at time t according to p(t) = F(x(t)).
The map is memoryless because the (deterministic) payoff at
time t depends solely on the (mean) population state also at
time t.
An important class of population games is defined below:
Definition 10. (Contractive Population Game) A given
population game F : X → Rn is qualified as contractive
if it satisfies the following condition:
(z − z¯)T (F(z)−F(z¯)) ≤ 0, z, z¯ ∈ X
The population game is said to be strictly contractive if the
inequality above is strict for z 6= z¯.
As shown in [24], when a contractive population game F
is played according to an EDM derived from a target protocol
that is integrable, or equivalently has a revision potential, the
trajectory of the mean population state is guaranteed to have
global convergence properties, which are established using
Lyapunov-like functions that are constructed from the revision
potentials.
7Work in [28] proposed a framework to extend the con-
tractive population game methodology to certain dynamically
modified payoffs, which in our formulation could be modeled
as PDMs. The underlying idea in [28] is to use techniques
related to δ-passivity for establishing sufficient conditions that
determine when the time derivative of the state trajectory of (7)
is L2 stable.
While, in [24], contractivity was a requirement for con-
vergence in the case of population games, the approach
by [28] for dynamically modified payoffs requires that the
PDM satisfies an inequality defining a condition called δ-
antipassivity. Interestingly, [28] shows that δ-antipassivity can
be rightly viewed as a generalization of contractivity because
any contractive population game is also δ-antipassive. Notably,
the analysis in [28] proves that when the PDM is δ-antipassive
and EDM results from an integrable target protocol then the
revision potential can be used to construct a storage function to
establish L2 stability of the solutions of (7). In general, when
such a storage function can be constructed, the EDM is shown
to be δ-passive, or equivalently, it satisfies an inequality that
is the antisymmetric of the one used to define δ-antipassivity.
We will revisit these concepts in § VI.
E. Problem Statement and Comparison with [28] and [24]
The analysis in [28] investigates stability of the derivative
of the mean population state in the L2 sense. Remarkably,
stability guarantees of the aforementioned sort do not imply
convergence of the mean population state towards any specific
equilibria as was done, for instance, in [24]. In particular, we
cannot use existing versions of Barbalat’s lemma [39] because
they presume constraints on the second derivative of the mean
population state that may not be verified in our framework in
which protocols may not be differentiable. In addition, even
if some version of Barbalat’s lemma could be constructed to
determine when the derivative of the mean population state
tends to zero4, it would not suffice to ascertain whether Nash
equilibria set, or perturbed versions of it, are globally attractive
or globally asymptotically stable.
Problem 1. (Main Problem) Consider that a PDM is given
and that F¯ is its stationary population game. For the EDM
classes associated with the protocol classes considered in [24],
we seek to determine the conditions on the PDM to guarantee
that a set of equilibria E(F¯), which in this article is either
NE(F¯) or a perturbed version of it, is globally attractive
or globally asymptotically stable according to the following
definitions.
Definition 11. (Stability Concepts) Let an EDM and a PDM
be given. The stability of a set E(F¯), which in our formulation
is either NE(F¯) or a perturbed version of it, is classified as
follows:
• (Global Attractiveness) The set E(F¯) is
globally attractive if for every initial condition
4In fact, even for elementary real-valued functions, convergence of the
derivative to zero as time tends to infinity does not, in general, guarantee that
the function converges to a constant. The function defined for nonnegative t
by log(t+ 1) is a simple example illustrating this fact.
(q(0), x(0)) in Rn × X, the solution trajectory (q, x)
of the mean closed loop model (7) is such that the
following limits hold:
lim
t→∞
(
inf
z∈E(F¯)
‖x(t)− z‖
)
= 0 (8a)
lim
t→∞
∥∥p(t)− F¯(x(t))∥∥ = 0 (8b)
• (Lyapunov Stability) The set E(F¯) is Lyapunov
stable if for every open set O in R2n that contains
A def= {(q, z) ∈ Rn × X | z ∈ E(F¯) and H(q, z) = F¯(z)},
there is another open set O′ that contains A for which
the following holds:
(q(0), x(0)) ∈ O′ ∩ (Rn × X) =⇒
(q(t), x(t)) ∈ O, t ≥ 0 (9)
• (Globally Asymptotically Stable) The set E(F¯) is glob-
ally asymptotically stable if it is globally attractive and
Lyapunov stable.
This definition stated above adapts to our framework anal-
ogous concepts used in [24].
1) Our Approach to Solving Problem 1 : In addition to
leveraging the use of and generalizing the passivity techniques
proposed in [28] to solve Problem 1, in § VI we introduce
new key concepts that ultimately lead to Lemma 1. The
latter is a central convergence result that will allow us to
propose solutions to Problem 1 for the two important EDM
classes studied in § VII and § VIII. It will follow from our
analysis in these sections that, in the particular case when
the PDM is a memoryless map specifying a population game,
our sufficient conditions for global attractiveness and global
asymptotic stability are analogous to those in [24].
In § IX, we also extend and adapt to our context an
important PDM class proposed in [28]. We also provide
extensions of [28, Theorem 4.6].
III. EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION OF POPULATION GAMES
AND EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS IN ENGINEERING
SYSTEMS AND OPTIMIZATION
The following examples illustrate applications of our for-
mulation to engineering problems, resource allocation and
optimization. Although in these examples the PDM is either
memoryless (population game) or has a fixed delay but no
other internal dynamics, they describe important applications
in which the results of this paper would be relevant to allow
internal dynamics in the PDM or protocols that are more
general. As we discuss in § I-C, by including additional
dynamics in the PDM one can model important effects, such
as inertia and anticipation in the agents’ perceptions of the
payoff.
1) Traffic assignment: The seminal work reported in [40]
investigates a traffic assignment problem in which the strate-
gies are the possible routes each agent may traverse to travel
from a location to another. The main result in [40] shows
that certain simple protocols, which lead to what was latter
called Smith dynamics [2, Example 5.6.1] and in our article
is referred to as Smith EDM (see Example 2), are guaranteed
8to steer the mean population state towards the Wardrop [41]
equilibrium of a given network cost-flow function. In the
context of population games, such a cost is a congestion
population game and the Wardrop equilibrium coincides with
the befitting version of Nash’s specified in Definition 6.
2) Distributed control strategies for resource allocation
and optimization: The distributed control strategies discussed
in [42] hinge on simple protocols to regulate flow distribution
in urban drainage systems, voltage split for lighting systems
and economic power dispatch in microgrids. The underlying
population games determining the payoff for these applications
have a strictly concave potential. In this setting, the same
Smith EDM mentioned in III-1, or appropriate modifications
thereof, guarantees that the mean population state will always
converge to the maximum of the potential, which is also the
unique Nash equilibrium of the population game. In fact, the
potential can be used as a Lyapunov function to establish
that its maximum is globally asymptotically stable. As is
explained in [21] and [2, § 3.1] the maximum of a strictly
concave potential is globally asymptotically stable under any
protocol satisfying positive correlation and Nash stationarity.
More generally, the set of Nash equilibria of a potential game -
as population games having a potential are called [22] - can
be determined by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
of local optimality of the potential. These results highlight
the relevance of our formulation for distributed optimization
and engineering applications in which a potential game is
constructed and implemented by a coordinator, as is done
in [42] and references therein, to promote distributed resource
allocation. Notably, as explained in [2, Example 3.1.2], con-
gestion population games in general admit a potential. In fact,
the potential has been used since the early work in [5] to
prove the existence of and also compute the Nash equilibria
of congestion games.
3) Distributed control strategies for wireless networks: The
approach in [43] uses the formalism of population games to
design and analyze the performance of distributed algorithms
that either trigger transmission or regulate the transmission
power of a large number of agents in the scenarios of slotted
ALOHA-based access network or W-CDMA power control,
respectively. In these scenarios, the strategy sets, or equiva-
lently the state of each agent, are {T,N} (transmit or not)
and {PH , PL} (high or low power), respectively. The payoff
for the ALOHA-based access network scenario captures the
net reward of transmitting successfully subject to a cost quan-
tifying the power spent. A population game captures the effect
of collisions that may arise from simultaneous transmissions.
In the W-CDMA power control scenario, the payoff captures
the ability to broadcast to other nodes and the underlying
population game also models the effect of interference that
occurs when neighboring agents transmit concurrently.
IV. POPULATION GAMES, EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND
MEAN FIELD GAMES: A BRIEF COMPARISON
Our approach builds on the established framework of evo-
lutionary dynamics and population games to take on the
more general case in which the payoff is governed by a
PDM. Hence, in order to precisely situate our work in light
of existing related methods and approaches, we proceed to
expounding the commonalities between our population-game-
inspired framework and that of evolutionary games, and we
will also discuss the most salient differences relative to mean
field games.
A. Population games and evolutionary games: background
and origins
Starting with the foundations laid by Maynard-Smith and
Price in [13], evolutionary game theory has been providing
a tractable and mathematically rigorous framework to model
and analyze the dynamics of natural selection according to
which phenotypes prosper or flounder based on their fitness,
as determined by their competitive advantages or drawbacks
relative to each other and the environment. An evolutionary
game that determines the fitness in terms of the traits of the
intervening organisms, and the evolutionary mechanism by
which reproduction is modulated based on the fitness form
the basic tenets of the theory [44].
Subsequent work, mostly by mathematicians and
economists [2], recognized that this theory could be adapted
and extended in the following ways to model the evolution of
strategy choices by a population of self-governing agents that
are coupled only through a payoff structure that influences
their decisions:
• The mathematical framework that is subjacent to evo-
lutionary game theory can also be used to analyze the
choice dynamics of populations of agents that are given
a set of strategies to choose from and which they can
repeatedly reconsider. According to this approach, in its
simplest form, the mechanism governing the reproduction
or depletion rate of a phenotype in terms of its fitness
is analogous to the one determining the rate of increase
or reduction of the prevalence of each strategy in one
or more populations. More specifically, the phenotype
selection mechanism and the concept of fitness for the
former are analogous to the so-called strategy revision
protocols and payoff used by the latter.
• Payoff mechanisms that are relevant for economics and
engineering, such as congestion games, can be adopted
and handled as natural generalizations of those that
determine the fitness in the evolutionary biology context.
In the context of large populations, in which deterministic
approximations are suitable, the payoff mechanism is
denoted as population game when it is a function of the
so-called social state comprising the portions of every
population choosing each strategy.
• Equilibrium selection notions for evolutionary games
such as ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy [13]) that
have important implications for stability analysis can
be further generalized when considering contractive (or
stable) [23], [24] population games. As is thoroughly
described in [45], the concept of ESS can be further re-
fined to account for strategies represented in uncountable
subsets of coordinate spaces that are suitable to describe
longterm adaptation of the strategy set. A model in which
9both the mean population state and the strategy set are
dynamic is described by the coupled equations in [46,
(16)] - a coupled dynamic that is reminiscent of the mean
closed loop model considered in § II-C.
After comparing [3, Chapters 3-5] and [2, Chapter 4-8], as
well as references therein, one concludes that although work
associated with evolutionary game theory is often focused
on replicator dynamics [12] or extensions of it, there is a
significant overlap of the goals and the tools used for the
analysis of stability relative to what is adopted in the study of
population games and evolutionary dynamics.
B. Comparing Population Games and Mean Field Games
The description in [47, chapter 2] suggests that the class
of mean field games (MFG) that is most similar to our frame-
work is that of first order MFG. Starting with the pioneering
work in [48]–[50], most work on first order mean field games
in an engineering context seeks to control a collective of
structurally dissociated dynamical systems (agents) in the limit
when the number of agents tends to infinity. Each agent in such
a setting is steered by a causal control policy that depends
on its own state and the so-called (deterministic) mean state,
which is analogous to the (deterministic) mean population state
adopted in our approach, or mean social state when there are
two or more populations, in that both specify at every instant
the portions of the population that attain every possible state
or set of states. The control law is the same across an entire
class (subgroup of identical agents), which is analogous to
imposing the same protocol for all members of each population
in the multi-population setting. In light of these similarities it is
important that we list the following fundamental differences
between the approach adopted here, and that of first order
MFG. Examples of application for our framework and that of
MFG to engineering problems are weaved in our discussion,
which will also clarify the most salient differences between
the two approaches.
1) Main differences between MFG and our approach: In
first order MFG, the set of strategies available to each agent
class comprises control policies that govern the control action
as a causal function of the mean state and the state of each
agent. The so-called Nash Certainty Equivalence principle
determines the control policy for each agent class from the
solution of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. We proceed
to describing the most significant differences between our
approach and that of MFG.
a) States and strategies: In our approach, the state of
each agent takes values in the strategy set. As a consequence,
the strategy (or state) of each agent is revised repeatedly,
which is in sharp contrast with the MFG approach in which
the control policy of each agent class that is computed once
off-line and used throughout the life of the MFG is a strategy.
b) Cost and payoff mechanism: While a cost is used to
compute the control policies for each agent class of a MFG,
in our approach a payoff mechanism is itself the feedback
component providing the payoff vector used by the agents
to revise their strategies. In the particular case in which the
payoff mechanism is a (memoryless) population game and
the revision protocols are of the best response type, our
approach is somewhat similar to a repeated game [51] in
which the stage game would be the population game. In this
analogy, we emphasize the qualifier ”similar” because unlike
a standard repeated game, the techniques, models, concepts
and objectives of our approach are tailored to deal with large
populations.
c) Equilibrium concepts: Characterization of relevant
mean social state equilibria for our approach are inspired on
Nash’s and defined with respect to the payoff mechanism.
When the payoff mechanism is a population game, the set
of Nash equilibria, or perturbed versions of it, is functionally
characterized in the usual way, and may be interpreted in the
mass-action sense proposed in [9] and further analyzed in [8].
In contrast, the so-called decentralized -Nash concept [48],
which can be viewed as a relaxation of the person-to-person
optimality notion [52] applied to the underlying cost, charac-
terizes the relevant equilibria set for a MFG.
d) Convergence to equilibria: In contrast to MFG, the
main goal of our framework is to establish concepts and
methods to determine whether the populations will react in
a way that the mean population state converges towards
equilibria of interest. Convergence to an equilibria set, such as
Nash’s, gives credence to both the ability of the populations
to self-organize using simple (bounded-rationality) protocols
in a distributed fashion and the value of the equilibria concept
to predict long-term behavior.
e) An MFG approach to power control for CDMA/CNO:
The work in [53] puts forth a MFG approach to the design
of power control for code division multiple access (CDMA)
cellular network optimization (CNO). The state of each agent
is the transmission power governed by the control policy,
which is the pre-optimized strategy assigned to the class the
agent belongs to. When the agents are mobile the state also
includes their locations in the Cartesian plane, in which case
the control policy not only governs the transmission power of
each agent but also steers it. A careful comparison between
this example with those of § III will certainly help clarify the
differences between our approach and that of MFG.
2) Advantages of our approach relative to MFG: Relative
to the MFG approach, whose benefits are self-evident from
the fact that the control policies are optimal for a given cost,
our approach has the following advantages:
a) Simplicity of protocols: In our formulation, the pro-
tocols that the agents use to revise their strategies are sim-
ple to implement and amenable to analysis supported on
conventional evolutionary principles. In addition, the agents
may not be synchronized because independent Poisson clocks
determine when each agent is allowed to revise its strategy.
In contrast, the policies followed by the agents in the MFG
approach are optimal, but may be intricate and difficult to
implement in practice.
b) Information structure: As is discussed in [11], the
information structures required to implement the various types
of revision protocols vary significantly. In contrast with MFG,
in general, the agents do not need to access the entire mean
social state.
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V. RELATING THE MEAN CLOSED LOOP MODEL WITH
THE POPULATION STATE AND PAYOFF OF LARGE
POPULATIONS
The framework in [16] uses classical results [18] to show
that, as the size of the population tends to infinity, the solutions
of the mean dynamics approximate with arbitrary accuracy,
in the sense of [16, Theorem 4.1], the realizations of the
population state. Furthermore, such an analysis, which can
also be found in [2, Chapter 10], is further refined in [17,
Lemma 1].
A. Finite population framework
Likewise, in this section, we proceed to outlining the con-
struction of a finite-population framework whose population
state and payoff can be approximated with arbitrary accuracy
uniformly over any given finite time interval by the solution of
the mean closed loop model (7) with probability approaching
one as the population size tends to infinity. Our approach is
to modify the framework in [16], [17] and [2, Chapter 10] to
comply with ours in which a PDM governs the deterministic
payoff.
Inspired by the construction in [16], we consider that the
population state of a single population with N agents is
represented by a right-continuous jump-process XN taking
values in XN defined as:
XN def=
(
1
N
Nn
)
∩ X
where without loss of generality we assume m = 1. A Poisson
process with positive rate % governs the revision times of each
agent. The N Poisson processes governing the revision times
for the agents are independent. Hence, a Poisson process with
rate N% governs the jump times of XN .
Given a pair (G,H) satisfying the conditions of Definition 4,
the payoff vector at time τ is represented by PN (τ), and is
obtained in terms of XN and a pre-determined initial condition
QN (0) in Rn as the unique solution of:
Q˙N (t) = G(QN (t), XN (t))
PN (t) = H(QN (t), XN (t)), t ≥ 0 (10)
In contrast to [16], [17], here we assume that F(XN (τ)) is
replaced with PN (τ) in the implementation5 of the protocol
that models the strategy revision process.
Following the approach in [2, §4.1.2], without loss of
generality, we assume that the following holds:
% ≥
n∑
j 6=i
Tij(r, z). r ∈ Rn, z ∈ X, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
For each agent whose current strategy is i, Tij(P
N (τ),XN (τ))
%
determines the probability that it will switch to strategy j,
conditioned on the event that it is allowed to switch at time τ .
5See also [2, Observation 10.1.2].
More specifically, XN is governed by the following proba-
bility transition law:
P
(
XNj (τ)− zj = 1N , XNi (τ)− zi = − 1N
∣∣∣ T)
= zi
Tij
(
r, z)
%
, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(11a)
P
(
XN (τ) = z
∣∣∣ T) = 1− n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
zi
Tij
(
r, z)
%
(11b)
where T is the event that there are consecutive jumps at times
τ− and τ , and
(
PN (τ−), XN (τ−)
)
= (r, z) holds for pre-
specified z and r in XN and Rn, respectively.
Given that, for any consecutive jump times τ− and τ ,
XN (t) is constant for t in [τ−, τ), from (10) we can deduce
the following update rule:
QN (τ)−QN (τ−) =
∫ τ
τ−
G(QN (γ), XN (τ−)) dγ (12)
where QN : [τ−, τ)→ Rn is the solution of (10) starting with
the initial condition QN (τ−).
From (11), we also infer that XN is unchanged if we replace
PN and QN with the right-continuous jump processes PˇN
and QˇN that get updated at every jump time τ according to
PˇN (τ) = PN (τ) and QˇN (τ) = QN (τ). Consequently, the
update rules specified in (11) and (12) imply that the pair
(XN , QˇN ) is a right-continuous Markov jump process that
satisfies the conditions of the framework in [18]. In addition,
for every (z, s) in XN × Rn and t ≥ 0, the following holds:
lim
δ↓0
E
[
1
δ
(
XN (t+ δ)− z
) ∣∣∣∣∣(
XN (t), QˇN (t)
)
= (z, s)
]
= VH(s, z) (13a)
lim
δ↓0
E
[
1
δ
(
QˇN (t+ δ)− s
) ∣∣∣∣∣(
XN (t), QˇN (t)
)
= (z, s)
]
= G(s, z) (13b)
B. Approximation in the limit of large populations
Hence, using [18, Theorem 2.11], we conclude from (13)
that given any positive t¯ and δ, and initial conditions
(x(0), q(0)) in X × Rn, the following holds for every se-
quence of initial states {(xN (0), qN (0))}∞N=1 that converges
to (x(0), q(0)):
lim
N→∞
P
(
sup
0≤t≤t¯
∥∥∥(XN (t), QˇN (t))− (x(t), q(t))∥∥∥ > δ) = 0
(14)
where (x(t), q(t)) is the solution of (7) and we assume
that for each N the process (XN , QˇN ) is initialized with
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QˇN (0) = qN (0) and XˇN (0) = xN (0). Since H is Lipschitz
continuous, from (14), we also conclude that the following
holds:
lim
N→∞
P
(
sup
0≤t≤t¯
∥∥∥(XN (t), PˇN (t))− (x(t), p(t))∥∥∥ > δ) = 0
(15)
As we discussed in § I-B1 for the particular case in which
the PDM is a population game (memoryless), Theorems [2,
12.B.3] and [2, 12.B.5], which are derived from work in [25]
and [26], ascertain under unrestrictive conditions that as the
population grows, the stationary distribution of the population
state tends to concentrate around the smallest globally asymp-
totically stable set. Although it is beyond the scope of this
article, we believe that immediate extensions of Theorems [2,
12.B.3] and [2, 12.B.5] to our context would show that the
stationary distribution of
(
XN (t), QˇN (t)
)
, when it exists, will
tend to concentrate around a globally asymptotic stable set of
the mean closed loop model as N tends to infinity.
VI. EDM δ-PASSIVITY, PDM δ-ANTIPASSIVITY, AND
MAIN SUPPORTING LEMMA
We start this section by defining key EDM and PDM prop-
erties, which we will use later on to state the conditions under
which our convergence results hold. Subsequently, in § VI-C
we state a key supporting lemma that we will use to establish
the convergence results presented in § VII through § VIII.
A. EDM δ-passivity and Informative Storage Functions
Given an EDM with input w and state x, the following
inequality is central for the definition of δ-passivity [28]:
S(x(t), w(t))− S(x(t0), w(t0)) ≤∫ t
t0
[
x˙T (τ)w˙(τ)− ηx˙T (τ)x˙(τ)] dτ,
t ≥ t0, t, t0 ∈ T, x(t0) ∈ X, w ∈ P (16)
where η and S : X×Rn → R+ are a nonnegative real constant
and a map, respectively.
Definition 12. (EDM δ-passivity)
Given an EDM, we adopt the following δ-passivity concepts:
• The EDM is said to be δ-passive if there is a continuously
differentiable S for which (16) is satisfied with η = 0.
• If the EDM is δ-passive, let η∗ be the supremum of
all η for which there is a continuously differentiable S
satisfying (16). If η∗ is positive then the EDM is qualified
as δ-passive with surplus η∗.
For either case, the map S is referred to as a
δ-storage function. We refer to the EDM generally as strictly
output δ-passive when it is δ-passive with some positive
surplus η∗.
Notice that the larger η∗ the more stringent the requirement
for strict output δ-passivity. When it is positive, we view such
η∗ as a measure of δ-passivity “surplus”.
As is discussed in [28], an EDM is δ-passive when the
following augmented system with input wδ and output xδ is
passive according to its standard definition [32]:
w˙(t) = wδ(t), w(0) ∈ Rn, wδ ∈ Pδ (17a)
x˙(t) = V(x(t), w(t)), x(0) ∈ X (17b)
xδ(t) = V(x(t), w(t)) (17c)
where Pδ def= {w˙|w ∈ P}. Notably, (x(t), w(t)) is the state
of the augmented system and S is a storage function for it.
As we will see later in § VI-C, if a δ-storage function is
informative, according to the following definition, then we can
use it to establish convergence results for the mean closed loop
model.
Definition 13. (Informative S) Let S : X× Rn → R+ be a
δ-storage function for a given EDM specified by V . We say
that S is informative if it satisfies the following two conditions:
V(z∗, r∗) = 0 =⇒ S(z∗, r∗) = 0, (18a)
∇Tz S(z∗, r∗)V(z∗, r∗) = 0 =⇒ V(z∗, r∗) = 0 (18b)
for every z∗ and r∗ in X and Rn, respectively.
The implication in (18a) suggests that, for a
constant deterministic payoff, every equilibrium
point of the EDM minimizes S. In addition, from
d
dtS(x(t), r) = ∇TxS(x(t), r)V(x(t), r), we could conclude
from (18b) that, for a constant deterministic payoff r,
S(x(t), r) is constant only if x(t) remains at an equilibrium
point of the EDM.
B. PDM δ-antipassivity and weak δ-antipassivity
The following conditions will be used in the definition of
δ-antipassivity for a given PDM with input u, state q, and
output p:
L(z, s) = 0⇔ H(s, z) = F¯(z), z ∈ X, s ∈ Rn (19a)
L(u(0), q(0))− L(u(t), q(t)) ≥∫ t
0
[
p˙T (τ)u˙(τ)− νu˙T (τ)u˙(τ)] dτ,
t ≥ 0, q(0) ∈ Rn, u ∈ X (19b)
where ν is a nonnegative constant, F¯ is the stationary popu-
lation game of the PDM, and L : X× Rn → R+ is a map.
Definition 14. (PDM δ-antipassivity) Given a PDM, we
consider the following cases:
• The PDM is said to be δ-antipassive if there is a con-
tinuously differentiable L for which (19) is satisfied for
ν = 0.
• The PDM is δ-antipassive with deficit ν∗ > 0 if there is
a continuously differentiable L for which (19) is satisfied
for every ν > ν∗.
A map L that satisfies either case is referred to as a δ-
antistorage function.
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Notice that there is an antisymmetry between (16) and (19b)
that is obtained from changing signs of certain terms and
swapping the output with the input. This correspondence
could be further strengthened by viewing L as a δ-antistorage
function that would be the antisymmetric equivalent of S.
An analogy similar to (17) is done in [28] to compare δ-
antipassivity with standard notions of passivity.
Given a PDM with input u, state q, and output p, the
following inequality is central to characterizing a weaker
notion of δ-antipassivity:
A(q(0), ‖u˙‖) ≥∫ t
0
[
p˙T (τ)u˙(τ)− νu˙T (τ)u˙(τ)] dτ,
t ≥ 0, q(0) ∈ Rn, u ∈ X (20)
where ν and A : Rn × R+ → R+ are a nonnegative real
constant and a map, respectively.
Definition 15. (PDM Weak δ-antipassivity) Given a PDM,
we consider the following cases:
• The PDM is said to be weak δ-antipassive if there is A
for which (20) is satisfied for ν = 0.
• The PDM is weak δ-antipassive with deficit ν∗ > 0 if
there is A for which (20) is satisfied for every ν > ν∗.
Unlike δ-antipassivity, which requires the existence of a
continuously differentiable δ-antistorage function L, weak δ-
antipassivity only requires the existence of a map A satisfy-
ing (20). Although well-known results [31], [54], [55] indicate
that a so-called “available” storage function can be constructed
when (20) is satisfied, there are no guarantees that it will
be continuously differentiable or satisfy (19a). The following
remark outlines an argument to establish that δ-antipassivity
indeed implies weak δ-antipassivity.
Remark 3. (δ-antipassivity implies weak δ-antipassivity)
Given a PDM, the following holds:
• If the PDM is δ-antipassive then it is weak δ-antipassive
and we can select A as:
A(q(0), ·) = max
z∈X
L(z, q(0)) (21)
where L is the δ-antistorage function of the PDM.
• This choice for A also allows us to conclude that if the
PDM is δ-antipassive with deficit ν∗ then it is also weak
δ-antipassive with deficit ν∗.
As we will see later in § VII and § VIII where we
study convergence of the mean population state to NE(F¯),
as well as perturbed versions of it, δ-antipassivity and weak
δ-antipassivity are prerequisites for global asymptotic stability
and global attractiveness, respectively. This confirms, as one
should expect, that because the δ-antipassivity condition is
stricter than its weak version, it leads to stronger stability
guarantees.
1) Contractivity and δ-antipassivity for memoryless PDM:
We proceed to stating in the following proposition, and sub-
sequently proving, that a memoryless PDM is δ-antipassive
if and only if its stationary population game is contractive in
the sense of Definition 10. Alternatively, one may assert that
δ-antipassivity gets to be contractivity in the particular case
when the PDM is a population game.
Proposition 2. Let F : X → Rn be a given continuously
differentiable map satisfying the following inequality:
z˜TDF(z)z˜ ≤ ν∗z˜T z˜, z ∈ X, z˜ ∈ TX (22)
Here, ν∗ is the least nonnegative real constant for which the
inequality holds. The following holds for the memoryless PDM
corresponding to the population game F .
• If ν∗ is zero then the PDM is δ-antipassive.
• If ν∗ is positive then the PDM is δ-antipassive with
deficit ν∗.
Proof. Recall that in this case F¯ = F and choose L(z, s) = 0.
Clearly, since H(s, z) = F(z), Assumption 2 and (19a) hold.
Also the fact that p˙T (t)u˙(t) = u˙T (t)DF(u(t))u˙(t) and (22)
imply that (19b) holds.
C. Main Supporting Lemma and Outline of Main Convergence
Results
We proceed with stating a lemma that ascertains conditions
on the EDM and PDM under which key stability properties
for the mean closed loop are guaranteed. The lemma will be
used as an important building block of the stability results in
§ VII and § VIII where we analyze well-known EDM classes.
Lemma 1. (Main Supporting Lemma)
Let a PDM and an EDM be given. We consider the following
two cases.
• (Case I) The PDM is weak δ-antipassive (ν∗ = 0) and the
EDM is δ-passive (η∗ = 0) with respect to an informative
δ-storage function S.
• (Case II) The PDM is weak δ-antipassive with deficit
ν∗ > 0 and the EDM is δ-passive with surplus η∗ > ν∗
with respect to an informative δ-storage function S.
If either Case I or Case II is true then the following holds:
lim
t→∞S(x(t), p(t)) = 0, (x(0), q(0)) ∈ X× R
n (23)
where the trajectory (x, p) is determined from the unique
solution of initial value problem for (7).
A proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix A. This lemma
will enable us to use S to proceed in a manner that is
analogous to how Lyapunov functions were used in [24]
to establish convergence of the mean population state to
meaningful equilibria of contractive population games, for
various classes of EDM.
Remark 4. (Trade-off in Case II) Notice that Case II of the
lemma allows for a PDM that is weak δ-antipassive with deficit
ν∗ > 0 at the expense of requiring that the EDM is δ-passive
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with surplus η∗ > ν∗. That is to say that a less stringent δ-
antipassivity requirement on the PDM can be counterbalanced
by an appropriately stricter δ-passivity condition on the EDM.
D. Comparison with related notions of passivity
In dynamical system theory, there are other notions of pas-
sivity, namely, incremental passivity [35], differential passivity
[33], [34] and equilibrium-independent passivity [30], [56].
For a certain class of dynamical system models, e.g., linear
system models, incremental passivity and differential passivity
are equivalent to δ-passivity; however, the equivalence would
not hold for nonlinear system models such as EDM (4)
considered in this paper. On the other hand, as we briefly
explain below, the qualification for equilibrium-independent
passivity is basically different from that of δ-passivity even
for linear system models.
In what follows, we compare these passivity notions with
δ-passivity in terms of their roles in establishing the sta-
bility of dynamical systems, and discuss the motivation for
our selection of δ-passivity. Essentially, incremental passivity
and differential passivity are used to analyze the so-called
incremental stability defined as the pairwise contraction of the
state trajectories of a dynamical system - a concept relevant in
synchronization and consensus problems. On the other hand,
inextricably related to Lyapunov stability, δ-passivity is used
to ascertain the convergence towards certain equilibria, which
in our context would typically be Nash or perturbed equilibria
of the stationary population game of a PDM. Hence, in com-
parison with incremental passivity and differential passivity,
δ-passivity is more adequate for the stability analysis provided
in this article.
In some cases, equilibrium-independent passivity could al-
ternatively be applied to an EDM (4) by considering, as we do
with δ-passivity, that w(t) and x(t) are the input and output,
respectively. Notably, the work in [57] used equilibrium-
independent passivity to investigate, for certain higher-order
learning rules, the convergence of either the mixed strategies
for a finite population, or the mean population state for an
infinite population, towards the perturbed equilibrium of a
negative-monotone payoff.
According the definition in [56], equilibrium-independent
passivity would hold in our context if for each w∗ in Rn,
there would be a continuously differentiable function Sw∗ :
X×Rn → R+ for which the following condition is satisfied:
Sw∗(x(t), w(t))− Sw∗(x(t0), w(t0)) ≤∫ t
t0
(x(τ)− x∗)T (w(τ)− w∗) dτ,
t ≥ t0, t, t0 ∈ T, x(t0) ∈ X, w ∈ P (24)
where x∗ would be a mean population state satisfying
V(x∗, w∗) = 0. Furthermore, the definition of equilibrium-
independent passivity in [56] would require that, for every
w∗ in Rn, there is a continuously differentiable Sw∗ satisfying
(24) for which x∗ is the unique state satisfying V(x∗, w∗) = 0.
Unfortunately, as can be inferred by analyzing Examples 1
and 2 in §VII-A and §VII-B describing the so called EPT and
BNN EDM, respectively, this uniqueness requirement is not
satisfied by important EDM classes, which further justifies our
adoption of δ-passivity to develop the approach reported in this
article. These examples will also not satisfy the assumptions
of the modified version of equilibrium-independent passivity
discussed in [30]. In particular, in these examples, if the
pair (x∗, w∗) satisfies V(x∗, w∗) = 0 then so will the pair
(x∗, χw∗) for any positive scalar χ, which violates a key
uniqueness requirement of [30, §3.1].
It is also interesting to note that when a memoryless PDM
is specified by a contractive game then not only it will be
δ-antipassive, as guaranteed by Proposition 2, but it will
also satisfy the antisymmetric of the condition required for
incremental passivity.
VII. NASH STATIONARITY AND CONVERGENCE TO NE(F¯)
We start by defining a key property called Nash Stationarity,
which will allow us to associate equilibria of an EDM with
the set of best responses to a deterministic payoff vector.
Definition 16. (Nash Stationarity) A given EDM specified by
V : X× Rn → Rn satisfies Nash stationarity if the following
equivalence holds:
V(z, r) = 0⇔ z ∈ arg max
z¯∈X
z¯T r, z ∈ X, r ∈ Rn (25)
In the framework of [24], Nash stationarity of the mean
dynamics is crucial to establishing that the mean population
state converges to the set of Nash equilibria of an underlying
contractive population game. Not surprisingly, it will also be
essential in our analysis, as is evidenced by the following
lemma. Fortunately, as we discuss in Remarks 5 and 7, the
EDM classes considered throughout this section satisfy Nash
stationarity.
Lemma 2. Consider that a mean closed loop model is formed
by a given PDM and an EDM that is Nash stationary, δ-
passive, and has an informative δ-storage function S. If the
PDM is weak δ-antipassive then NE(F¯) is globally attractive.
If the PDM is δ-antipassive then NE(F¯) is globally asymp-
totically stable.
A proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix A. Notice
that Lemma 2 is restricted to the case in which the EDM
is δ-passive and the PDM is either weak δ-antipassive or δ-
antipassive. This stands in contrast with Case II of Lemma 1,
which allows a PDM to be weak δ-antipassive with positive
deficit ν∗ at the expense of restricting the EDM to be δ-passive
with surplus η∗ > ν∗. This level of generality is not viable for
the EPT and IPC EDM defined below because, as we show in
[38, Corollary IV.3], they are not strictly output δ-passive.
A. Integrable Excess Payoff Target (EPT) EDM
We start by defining Excess Payoff Target (EPT) EDM by
specifying the properties that the associated protocol must
satisfy.
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Definition 17. (Excess Payoff Target (EPT) EDM)
A given protocol T yields an EPT EDM if it can be written
as:
Tij(r, z) = T EPTj (rˆ)
rˆi
def
= ri − 1m
∑n
i=1 rizi
, r ∈ Rn, z ∈ X (26)
where T EPT : Rn∗ → Rn+ is a Lipschitz continuous map, rˆ is
the vector of excess payoff relative to the population average
and Rn∗ = Rn − int(Rn−) is the set of possible excess payoff
vectors. In addition, T EPT must satisfy the following acuteness
condition:
rˆTT EPT(rˆ) > 0, rˆ ∈ int(Rn∗ ) (27)
A comprehensive analysis and motivation for this protocol
class is provided in [58].
Remark 5. (EPT EDM is Nash Stationary)
In order to simplify the structure of our article, and given that
there is no significant disadvantage in doing so, we adopt
the convention that every EPT EDM satisfies acuteness (27).
A trivial adaptation to our formulation of [2, Theorem 5.5.2
and Exercise 5.5.7] for excess payoff target dynamics shows
that our acuteness assumption guarantees that every EPT
EDM is Nash stationary, which is crucial for the results in
this section.
Definition 18. (Integrable EPT EDM) A given EPT protocol
T EPT : Rn∗ → Rn+ is integrable if there is a continuously
differentiable function IEPT : Rn → R such that the following
holds:
T EPT(rˆ) = ∇IEPT(rˆ), rˆ ∈ Rn∗ (28)
We refer to IEPT as the revision potential of T EPT.
We can now proceed with establishing that any given
EPT EDM with integrable protocol is δ-passive and has an
informative δ-storage function. This key step will allow us
to use Lemma 2 to ascertain in Theorem 1 that the mean
population state of a mean closed loop model converges
globally to NE(F¯).
Proposition 3. If a given EPT EDM is integrable with revision
potential IEPT then it is δ-passive and there is a constant γ for
which SEPT given below is an informative δ-storage function:
SEPT(z, r) = IEPT(rˆ)− γ, z ∈ X, r ∈ Rn (29)
In addition, the following equivalence holds:
SEPT(z, r) = 0⇔ z ∈ arg max
z¯∈X
z¯T r, z ∈ X, r ∈ Rn (30)
A proof of Proposition 3 is given in Appendix B. Notice
that Proposition 3 extends [28, Theorem 4.4] in two ways.
• Unlike Proposition 3, each δ-storage function in [28,
Theorem 4.4] is constructed for a given upper-bound
on ‖r‖, which must be known a priori (see also [28,
Eq. (62)]). For each integrable EPT EDM, our construc-
tion provides a unique δ-storage function without any
such assumptions.
• More importantly, Proposition 3 guarantees that a con-
stant γ exists for which (30) holds. This is a key fact in
proving Theorem 1, and consequently Corollary 2, at the
level of generality we have here.
The following specifies an important subclass of integrable
EPT EDM for which a δ-storage function can be readily
constructed.
Definition 19. (Separable EPT EDM) A given EPT EDM is
separable if its protocol T EPT can be written as:
T EPTj (rˆ) = T SEPTj (rˆj), rˆ ∈ Rn∗ , j ∈ {1, . . . , n} (31)
where T SEPTj : R → R+ is a Lipschitz continuous map for
each j in {1, . . . , n}.
The following corollary follows from Proposition 3 and the
fact that a separable EPT protocol is also integrable.
Corollary 1. If a given EPT EDM is separable with protocol
T SEPT then it is δ-passive and SSEPT given below is an
informative δ-storage function:
SSEPT(z, r) =
n∑
i=1
∫ rˆi
0
T SEPTi (τ) dτ, z ∈ X, r ∈ Rn (32)
The following is a widely used example of EPT protocol,
which was originally introduced in [59] to prove key properties
of two-player zero-sum games.
Example 1. (BNN EDM) The Brown-von Neumann-Nash
(BNN) EDM, as named in [20], is specified by the following
separable EPT protocol6:
T BNNj (rˆ) def= [rˆj ]+, rˆ ∈ Rn∗ (33)
The following is the associated δ-storage function, which is
informative:
SBNN(z, r) = 1
2
n∑
i=1
[rˆi]
2
+, z ∈ X, r ∈ Rn (34)
When agents follow the BNN protocol they are likely to
switch to strategies whose payoff is higher than the average
payoff for the population. The higher the excess payoff for a
given strategy, relative to the average, the more likely an agent
will select it.
We can now state our main theorem establishing an impor-
tant convergence theorem for integrable EPT EDM.
Theorem 1. Consider a mean closed loop model formed by
an integrable EPT EDM and a PDM. If the PDM is weak δ-
antipassive then NE(F¯) is globally attractive. If the PDM is
δ-antipassive then NE(F¯) is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Proposition 3,
Lemma 2, and Remark 5.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of
Proposition 2 and Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. Consider that a memoryless PDM is specified
by a given continuously differentiable contractive population
6See also [2, Examples 5.5.1 and Exercise 5.5.1].
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game F . Let a mean closed loop model be formed by an
integrable EPT EDM and the memoryless PDM. The set
NE(F) is globally asymptotically stable.
Remark 6. (Corollary 2 extends [24, Theorem 5.1]) Notice
that, in what regards the trajectory of the mean population
state, when the PDM is memoryless the mean closed loop
model is equivalent to the formulation in [24, Eq. (E) of
§ 4.3]. Consequently, Corollary 2 extends [24, Theorem 5.1]
because the latter guarantees global asymptotic stability only
when the protocol is separable or F has a unique Nash
equilibrium. Our more general result is possible, in part,
because Proposition 3 asserts the important fact that a δ-
storage function satisfying (30) exists for any integrable EPT
protocol.
B. Impartial Pairwise Comparison (IPC) EDM: Convergence
Properties
We now proceed with defining and characterizing global
convergence properties for impartial pairwise compari-
son (IPC) EDM, whose designation was proposed in [11] for
a more general context.
Definition 20. (Impartial Pairwise Comparison (IPC)
EDM) A given protocol T yields an impartial pairwise
comparison (IPC) EDM if it can be written as:
Tij(r, z) = T IPCj (rj − ri), r ∈ Rn, z ∈ X (35)
where T IPC : Rn → Rn+ is a Lipschitz continuous map, which
also satisfies the following sign preservation condition:{
T IPCj (rj − ri) > 0, if rj > ri
T IPCj (rj − ri) = 0, if rj ≤ ri
, r ∈ Rn (36)
According to an IPC protocol, an agent is likely to switch
to strategies offering a higher payoff. Typically, the likelihood
of switching to a given strategy increases with its payoff.
Remark 7. (IPC EDM is Nash Stationary) It follows from
a trivial modification of [2, Theorem 5.6.2] that the IPC EDM
also satisfies Nash stationarity.
The following proposition shows that the method to con-
struct the Lyapunov function in [24, Theorem 7.1] can be
adapted to obtain an informative δ-storage function for an IPC
EDM.
Proposition 4. Let a Lipschitz continuous map
T IPC : Rn → Rn+ specify the protocol of an IPC EDM.
The IPC EDM is δ-passive and the map S IPC : X×Rn → R+
defined below is an informative δ-storage function:
S IPC(z, r) def=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
zi
∫ rj−ri
0
T IPCj (τ) dτ,
z ∈ X, r ∈ Rn (37)
A simple example is the so-called Smith EDM defined
below, which was originally proposed in [40] to investigate
a traffic assignment problem.
Example 2. (Smith EDM) The Smith EDM is specified by
the following Smith IPC protocol7:
T Smithj (rj − ri) def= [rj − ri]+, r ∈ Rn (38)
The following is the associated δ-storage function, which is
informative:
SSmith(z, r) def=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
zi[rj − ri]2+ (39)
We can finally make use of Lemma 2 to state our main
stability theorem for IPC EDM.
Theorem 2. Consider a mean closed loop model formed by
an IPC EDM and a PDM. If the PDM is weak δ-antipassive
then NE(F¯) is globally attractive. If the PDM is δ-antipassive
then NE(F¯) is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Proposition 4,
Lemma 2, and Remark 7.
VIII. PERTURBED BEST RESPONSE (PBR) EDM:
CONVERGENCE TO PE(F¯ ,Q)
In this section, we consider a class of protocols according
to which the mean population state is steered towards its
best response to a perturbed payoff. The perturbation models
imperfections in the perception of the payoff by the agents.
In a prescriptive scenario or engineering application, the
perturbation could account for sensor noise or limitations
of the network disseminating payoff and population state
information.
Definition 21. (Payoff Perturbation) Let Q : int(X)→ R be
a given map. We deem Q an admissible payoff perturbation
if it is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies the
following conditions:
z˜T∇2Q(z)z˜ > 0, z ∈ X, z˜ ∈ TX− {0} (40)
lim
zmin→0
‖∇Q(z)‖ =∞, where zmin def= min
1≤i≤n
zi (41)
The subset of X for which zmin is zero is often referred to as
boundary of X and is denoted as bd(X). For every admissible
perturbation Q, below we also define the associated perturbed
maximizer:
MQ(r) def= arg max
z∈int(X)
(
zT r −Q(z)) (42)
The so-called choice function can be computed as
CQ(r) = 1mMQ(r) for r in Rn.
§ 6.2 of [2] includes a comprehensive discussion of the
properties of MQ. Notably, it explains why, for each r in
Rn, MQ(r) takes a single value in int(X), in contrast with
best response maps that are in general set valued, and it also
discusses analogs of most of the notions we will define below.
The seminal article [60] offers a well-documented justification
7See also [2, Example 5.6.1 and Exercise 5.6.1].
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for the model adopted here and [61] provides an important
discrete choice theorem relating Q with the distribution of
the additive noise that characterizes a probabilistic formulation
of CQ.
Convention: We should note that in most published work,
the domain of the payoff perturbation is a normalized version
of X denoted by ∆ = { 1mz|z ∈ X}. However, we find that, in
our context, stating the definitions and results consistently in
terms of X simplifies our notation.
The following is the general form of the PBR EDM, which
was originally proposed in an slightly different but equivalent
form in [62].
Definition 22. (Perturbed best response (PBR) EDM)
Consider that an admissible payoff perturbation Q is given.
A given protocol T yields a perturbed best response (PBR)
EDM associated with Q if it can be written as:
Tij(r, z) = CQj (r), r ∈ Rn, z ∈ X (43)
The following expression is determined according to (6):
V˜Q(z, r) =MQ(r)− z, z ∈ X, r ∈ Rn (44)
A. Perturbed Stationarity for PBR EDM
Unlike the EPT EDM and IPC EDM described in § VII,
the PBR EDM does not satisfy Nash stationarity. However, as
pointed out in [2, Observation 6.2.7], it does satisfy Perturbed
Stationarity as defined below.
Definition 23. (Perturbed Equilibrium Set and Virtual
Payoff)
Given a PDM with continuously differentiable F¯ and an
admissible payoff perturbation Q, the associated perturbed
equilibrium is defined as:
PE(F¯ ,Q) def= {z ∈ X ∣∣ z =MQ(F¯(z))} (45)
An immediate adaptation of [2, Theorem 6.2.8] to our
context leads to the conclusion that the perturbed equilibrium
can also be specified as the Nash equilibrium of the so-called
virtual payoff F˜Q : int(X)→ Rn defined as:
F˜Q(z) def= F¯(z)−∇Q(z), z ∈ int(X) (46)
In summary, we can state the following:
NE(F˜Q) = PE(F¯ ,Q) (47)
Remark 8. (Perturbed Stationarity) It is an immediate
consequence of (44) that the PBR EDM satisfies the following
equivalence also referred to as perturbed stationarity:
V˜Q(z, r) = 0⇔ z =MQ(r), z ∈ X, r ∈ Rn (48)
In addition, it follows from [60, Theorem 3.1] that if F¯ is
continuously differentiable and contractive then PE(F¯ ,Q) is
a singleton.
B. δ-passivity Characterization for PBR EDM
The following proposition establishes δ-passivity properties
for a given PBR EDM, which will allow us to use Lemma 1
to assert in Theorem 3 sufficient conditions under which
PE(F¯ ,Q) is globally attractive and globally asymptotically
stable.
Proposition 5. Consider that an admissible payoff perturba-
tion Q is given, for which we define the following candidate
δ-storage function:
SPBR(z, r) def= max
z¯∈int(X)
(
z¯T r −Q(z¯))− (zT r −Q(z)),
z ∈ X, r ∈ Rn (49)
Let η∗ be the infimum of all nonnegative constants η for which
the following holds:
z˜T∇2Q(z)z˜ ≥ ηz˜T z˜, z ∈ int(X), z˜ ∈ TX (50)
One of the two cases holds:
• (Case I) If η∗ ≥ 0 then the PBR EDM is δ-passive and
SPBR is an informative δ-storage function.
• (Case II) If η∗ > 0 then the PBR EDM is δ-passive with
surplus η∗ and SPBR is an informative δ-storage function.
A proof of Proposition 5 is given in Appendix B. Notice
that [60, Theorem 3.1] uses a Lyapunov function that is
analogous to SPBR to establish convergence results in the
framework of contractive population games.
Example 3. (Logit EDM) The Logit EDM is specified by the
following protocol8:
CQi (r) def=
eη
−1ri∑n
j=1 e
η−1rj
, r ∈ Rn (51)
where η is a positive constant. The following is the associated
δ-storage function, which is informative:
SLogit(z, r) = max
z¯∈int(X)
(
z¯T r −Q(z¯))− (zT r −Q(z)),
z ∈ X, r ∈ Rn (52)
where the payoff perturbation Q is given by Q(z) =
η
∑n
i=1 zi ln zi.
C. Global Convergence to Perturbed Equilibria for PBR EDM
At this point, we have defined all the key concepts and
presented the preliminary results required to state our main
theorem establishing the conditions under which we can
guarantee global convergence to PE(F¯ ,Q).
Theorem 3. Consider a mean closed loop model formed by
a δ-passive PBR EDM characterized by an admissible payoff
perturbation Q and a PDM with a continuously differentiable
F¯ . One of the following two cases holds:
• (Case I) If the PDM is weak δ-antipassive then PE(F¯ ,Q)
is globally attractive. If the PDM is δ-antipassive then
PE(F¯ ,Q) is globally asymptotically stable.
8See also [60].
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• (Case II) If the PDM is weak δ-antipassive with positive
deficit ν∗ and the PBR EDM is δ-passive with surplus
η∗ > ν∗ then PE(F¯ ,Q) is globally attractive. If the
PDM is δ-antipassive with positive deficit ν∗ and the PBR
EDM is δ-passive with surplus η∗ > ν∗ then PE(F¯ ,Q)
is globally asymptotically stable.
A proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix B.
IX. SMOOTHING-ANTICIPATORY PDM: DEFINITION AND
δ-ANTIPASSIVITY PROPERTIES
In this section, we study the class of so-called smoothing-
anticipatory PDM, which extends both the anticipatory and
smoothing modified payoff dynamics, which were considered
in [28], [63]–[65] to account for learning dynamics.
We start with defining the smoothing-anticipatory PDM
class in a way that is consistent with our formulation. Sub-
sequently, in § IX-A and § IX-B, we establish sufficient
conditions under which a smoothing-anticipatory PDM is δ-
antipassive for the case when the stationary population game
is potential.
Definition 24. (Smoothing-Anticipatory PDM) Consider
that F : X→ Rn is a given continuously differentiable map
defining a population game. Given a positive constant α and
non-negative parameters µ0, µ1, and µ2 satisfying µ0 +µ1 =
1, the associated smoothing-anticipatory PDM is defined as
follows:
q˙(t) =α
(
F(u(t))− q(t)) (53a)
p(t) =µ0F
(
u(t)
)
+ µ1q(t) + µ2q˙(t) (53b)
for t ≥ 0, q(0) ∈ Rn, and u ∈ X.
In order to show that (53b) complies with (1), it suffices to
notice that we can substitute the expression (53a) for q˙(t) to
get the following alternative formula for p(t):
p(t) = (µ0 + αµ2)F
(
u(t)
)
+ (µ1 − αµ2)q(t)
Remark 9. The following are parameter choices leading to
existing PDM types:
• When µ0 = 1 and µ1 = µ2 = 0 the PDM is memoryless.
• When µ0 = 1, µ1 = 0, and µ2 > 0 we obtain an
anticipatory PDM, as considered in [28], [63]–[65].
• The smoothing PDM considered in [28] is obtained when
µ0 = 0, µ1 = 1, and µ2 = 0.
The following proposition guarantees that any smoothing-
anticipatory PDM satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2.
Proposition 6. Let F : X→ Rn be a given continuously
differentiable map defining a population game. Given positive
α and non-negative µ0, µ1, and µ2 satisfying µ0 + µ1 = 1,
the associated smoothing-anticipatory PDM satisfies Assump-
tion 1 (boundedness). It also satisfies Assumption 2, and the
stationary population game is F¯ = F .
Proof. We start by writing the explicit solution of (53) for a
given input u in X and q(0) in Rn:
q(t) = α
∫ t
0
e−α(t−τ)F(u(τ)) dτ + e−αtq(0), t ≥ 0 (54)
Since F is continuous, we conclude from (54) that the
following inequality holds and the right-hand side is finite:
‖q‖ ≤ max
z∈X
‖F(z)‖+ ‖q(0)‖, (55)
which implies that the PDM is bounded in the sense of
Assumption 1. In order to prove that F¯ = F , we use a
Lyapunov-like argument based on the following function:
L(z, s) = 1
2α
(F(z)−s)T (F(z)−s), z ∈ X, s ∈ Rn (56)
Now, we can use this to calculate the following derivative:
d
dt
L(u(t), q(t)) = −2αL(u(t), q(t))
+
1
α
(
F(u(t))− q(t))TDF(u(t))u˙(t) (57)
Since F is continuously differentiable, ‖u‖ ≤ m, and,
as we proved above, q is bounded, we conclude that
when u˙(t) tends to zero the second term on the right-hand
side above vanishes, which implies that the following limit
holds:
lim
t→∞ ‖q(t)−F
(
u(t)
)‖ = 0 (58)
As a result, from (53a) we infer that q˙ tends to zero and
from (53b) we conclude that limt→∞ ‖p(t) − µ0F
(
u(t)
) −
µ1q(t)‖ = 0. Finally, using this fact, that µ0 + µ1 = 1, and
(58) we infer that limt→∞ ‖p(t)−F
(
u(t)
)‖ = 0.
Also, we note that the set {(z, s) ∈ X × Rn |H(z, s) =
F(z)} is equivalent to either a compact subset {(z, s) ∈
X × Rn | s = F(z)} if µ1 6= αµ2, or the entire set X × Rn
otherwise. This means that Assumption 2 is satisfied and the
stationary population game is well-defined and is given by
F¯ = F .
A. Smoothing-Anticipatory PDM when F is Potential Affine
Notice that δ-antipassivity for the classes of anticipatory and
smoothing PDM was studied separately in [28] for the case
when F is affine, potential, and strictly contractive. Below, in
Proposition 7, we determine sufficient conditions for weak δ-
antipassivity for smoothing-anticipatory PDM associated with
affine potential F that is not required to be strictly contractive.
Definition 25. (Projection matrix Φ) Henceforth, we will use
a projection matrix Φ in Rn×n defined as follows:
Φij =
{
n−1
n if i = j
− 1n otherwise
(59)
Definition 26. Given a real symmetric matrix M , the largest
eigenvalue of M is represented as λ¯(M).
Proposition 7. Let F be an affine population game specified
as follows:
F(z) = Fz + r¯, z ∈ X (60)
where F ∈ Rn×n is such that ΦFΦ is symmetric9, and r¯ is
a constant vector in Rn. Consider that F , a given positive α,
9This implies that F is a potential population game. See [2] for more
details.
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and non-negative µ0, µ1, and µ2 satisfying µ0 +µ1 = 1 define
a smoothing-anticipatory PDM. Let λ∗ be selected as:
λ∗ = λ¯
(
ΦFΦ)
The PDM satisfies the following:
i) If λ∗ = 0 then the PDM is weak δ-antipassive.
ii) If λ∗ > 0 and µ0 + αµ2 ≤ 1 then the PDM is weak
δ-antipassive with deficit λ∗.
iii) If λ∗ > 0 and µ0 + αµ2 > 1 then the PDM is weak
δ-antipassive with deficit (µ0 + αµ2)λ∗.
A proof of Proposition 7 is given in Appendix C.
Proposition 8. If, in addition to the conditions of Proposi-
tion 7, a PDM is specified by a symmetric and negative definite
F then it is δ-antipassive.
Proof. The proof mirrors that of [28, Theorem 4.5, Theo-
rem 4.7] by showing that L given below is a δ-antistorage
function satisfying (19).
L(z, s) = −(Fz+ r¯−s)TF−1(Fz+ r¯−s), z ∈ X, s ∈ Rn
(61)
B. Smoothing PDM when F is Potential Nonlinear
In the following proposition, we establish δ-antipassivity of
smoothing PDM (see Remark 9). We note that unlike the case
considered in Proposition 7, we allow an associated population
game F to be nonlinear.
Proposition 9. Let F : X → Rn admit a strictly concave
potential function f : Rn → R for which ∇f = F holds
on X. Suppose that f is twice continuously differentiable
and Im(F) ⊂ int(D∗) holds, where Im(F) and D∗ are,
respectively, defined as
Im(F) = {F(z) | z ∈ X}
D∗ =
{
s ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣ sup
y∈Rn
(f(y)− sT y) <∞
}
Consider that F and a given positive α define a smoothing
PDM for which q(0) ∈ int(D∗) holds. The PDM is δ-
antipassive and its δ-antistorage function is given by
L(z, s) = α
[
sup
y∈Rn
(f(y)− sT y)− (f(z)− sT z)
]
(62)
A proof of Proposition 9 is given in Appendix C.
Remark 10. In Proposition 9, we assume that the initial
condition of the smoothing PDM satisfies q(0) ∈ int(D∗). In
fact, based on Lemma 5, it can be verified that given any
q(0) ∈ Rn and u ∈ X, q(t) of the PDM converges to a
compact convex subset of int(D∗) containing Im(F). This
implies that the state trajectory q enters the set int(D∗) in
a finite time.
e1
e2 e3
Fig. 2. Mean population state trajectories induced by the BNN EDM under
a memoryless PDM defined by the coordination population game (63).
e1
e2 e3
Fig. 3. Mean population state trajectories induced by the Logit EDM under
a memoryless PDM defined by the coordination population game (63).
C. Examples
We provide examples, with numerical simulations, to
demonstrate how our main results can be used to assess
converge to equilibria of the mean closed loop model when the
deterministic payoff is governed by a conventional population
game (memoryless PDM) or a smoothing-anticipatory PDM.
Example 4 (Coordination Population Game). Consider the
payoff map given below for a coordination population game:
F(z) =
1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
z1z2
z3
 (63)
A memoryless PDM defined by (63) is δ-antipassive with
strictly positive deficit ν∗ = 1 but is not δ-antipassive. In
what follows, based on Theorem 1, Theorem 3, and numerical
simulations, we examine stability of equilibrium points of (63)
in a mean closed loop model configuration formed by the PDM
together with either the BNN EDM (see Example 1) or Logit
EDM (see Example 3).
Note that the payoff map (63) has multiple Nash equilibria
including
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
, and under the perturbation Q(z) =
1.1
∑3
i=1 zi ln zi, it has a unique perturbed equilibrium given
by
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
. It can be inferred from our results in § VII that
the BNN EDM is not strictly output δ-passive, which yields
that the mean closed loop model formed by the PDM and the
BNN EDM violates the conditions of Theorem 1. In contrast,
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Fig. 4. Mean population state trajectories induced by the BNN EDM under
an anticipatory PDM defined by the RPS population game (64).
e1
e2 e3
Fig. 5. Mean population state trajectories induced by the BNN EDM under
a smoothing PDM defined by the congestion population game (65).
the mean closed loop model formed by the PDM and the Logit
EDM with η = 1.1 satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.
Figs. 2 and 3 compare the mean population state trajecto-
ries obtained from both configurations. Notice that under the
first configuration the set of Nash equilibria is not asymp-
totically stable since any state trajectory starting from the
neighborhood of the equilibrium
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
does not converge
to the equilibrium, unless the trajectory starts from it. On the
other hand, under the second configuration the perturbed equi-
librium is asymptotically stable. The numerical simulations
illustrate that instability of the equilibria of (63) may occur
when our sufficient conditions for stability are violated.
Example 5 (Rock-Paper-Scissors Population Game). Consider
the payoff map given below for a Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS)
population game:
F(z) =
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0
z1z2
z3
 (64)
where the population game has a unique Nash equilibrium
given by
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
. Recall that unlike the δ-antipassivity
conditions for memoryless PDM, those for the anticipatory
PDM (see Remark 9) require its stationary population game
to be symmetric as stated in Proposition 7. In what follows,
using numerical simulations, we demonstrate that violating
the symmetry requirement may result in instability of the
equilibrium of (64).
Consider a mean closed loop model formed by the antic-
ipatory PDM defined by (64) and the BNN EDM, where we
select a parameter choice α = 1, µ2 = 0.1 for the PDM. Note
that (64) does not satisfy the symmetry requirement and this
violates the conditions of Proposition 7. The plots in Fig. 4
illustrate the resulting mean population state trajectories.
Notice that the trajectories do not converge to the Nash
equilibrium of (64).
Example 6 (Congestion Population Game). Consider the
payoff map given below for a congestion population game:
F(z) =
e−z1e−z2
e−z3
 (65)
where the concave potential of F is given by
f(z) =
3∑
i=1
(1− e−zi) (66)
The payoff map has a unique Nash equilibrium given by(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
. Different from the previous examples, (65) is a
nonlinear payoff map.
Consider the smoothing PDM defined by (65) with a pa-
rameter choice α = 1. We note that the domain D∗ of the
Legendre conjugate of f is given by D∗ = R3+, which ensures
that the condition Im(F) ⊂ int(D∗) stated in Proposition 9
holds. Fig. 5 illustrates the mean population state trajectories
obtained from the mean closed loop model of the PDM and
the BNN EDM. Notice that the trajectories converge to the
Nash equilibrium of (65).
APPENDIX
The following three lemmas are key to the proofs of the
main results.
Lemma 3. Given an EDM (4) specified by V , consider the
following two relations: For every z and r in X and Rn,
respectively,
∇rS(z, r) = V(z, r) (67a)
∇Tz S(z, r)V(z, r) ≤ −ηVT (z, r)V(z, r) (67b)
where η and S : X×Rn → R+ are a nonnegative constant and
a map, respectively. The following two statements are true:
1) The EDM is δ-passive if and only if there is a continu-
ously differentiable S satisfying (67) with η = 0.
2) For positive η, the EDM is qualified as δ-passive with
surplus η if and only if there is continuously differentiable
S satisfying (67).
Proof: As described in § VI, the EDM (4) can be viewed
as a control-affine nonlinear system (17) with the input wδ(t),
state (x(t), w(t)), and output xδ(t). Using the passivity char-
acterization theorem (see, for instance, [55, Theorem 1]) for
control-affine systems, we can see that there is a continuously
differentiable S satisfying (67) with η ≥ 0 if and only if S
satisfies the inequality (16) with the same η. The statements
1) and 2) immediately follow from this equivalence.
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Lemma 4. Given a δ-passive EDM (4) with its δ-storage
function S, let S = {(z, r) ∈ X × Rn | V(z, r) = 0} be
the stationary points of the EDM and S−1(0) = {(z, r) ∈
X × Rn | S(z, r) = 0} be global minima of S. It holds that
S−1(0) ⊆ S and the equality holds if the EDM satisfies Nash
stationarity, where we assume that the set S−1(0) is non-
empty.
Proof: The first part of the statement directly follows from
the condition (67a) and the fact that at a global minimizer
(z∗, r∗) of S, it holds that ∇rS(z∗, r∗) = 0.
Now suppose that the EDM satisfies Nash stationarity. To
prove the second statement, it is sufficient to show that at each
equilibrium point (zo, ro) of (4), it holds that S(zo, ro) = 0.
To this end, let us consider the payoff map given by Fzo(z) =
−(z − zo) for a fixed zo in X. Notice that zo is the unique
Nash equilibrium of the population game. In what follows, we
show that S(zo, ro) = 0 holds for any choice of (zo, ro) in S.
Let (z∗, r∗) be a global minimizer of S, i.e., S (z∗, r∗) = 0.
By the first part of the statement, (25), and (67a), we have that
V(z∗, σr∗) = 0 for all σ in R+, and hence it holds that
S(z∗, 0) = S(z∗, r∗)−
∫ 1
0
(r∗)T V(z∗, σr∗) dσ = 0
By the continuity of S, for each  > 0, there exists δ > 0 for
which S (z∗, δFzo(z∗)) <  holds.
Given input w(t) = δFzo(x(t)), let x be the mean popula-
tion state trajectory derived by the EDM. Since the EDM is
δ-passive, according to (67), the following relation holds for
every positive constant δ:
d
dt
S(x(t), δFzo(x(t)))
≤ δVT (x(t), δFzo(x(t)))DFz0(x(t))V(x(t), δFzo(x(t)))
= −δ ‖V (x(t), δFzo(x(t)))‖2 (68)
Suppose that the mean population state x(t) satisfies the initial
condition x(0) = z∗. By an application of LaSalle’s theorem
[19] and by (25), we can verify that (x(t), δFzo(x(t))) con-
verges to (zo, 0) as t→∞. In addition, due to (68), we have
that
S (zo, 0) ≤ S (z∗, δFz0(z∗)) < 
Since this holds for every  > 0, we conclude that S(zo, 0) =
0. By the fact that V(zo, σro) = 0 for all σ in R+ if (zo, ro)
belongs to S, we can see that the following equality holds for
every ro for which (zo, ro) belongs to S:
S(zo, ro) = S(zo, 0) +
∫ 1
0
rTo V(zo, σro) dσ = 0 (69)
Since we made an arbitrary choice of zo from X in con-
structing the payoff map Fzo , we conclude that (69) holds for
every (zo, ro) in S. This proves the lemma.
Lemma 5. Consider a differential equation given by
q˙(t) = α (v(t)− q(t)) (70)
where α is a positive constant and v is a continuous
function that takes a value in a closed convex subset F
of Rn. The set F is positively invariant and it holds that
limt→∞ (infs∈F ‖q(t)− s‖) = 0 for any q(0) ∈ Rn.
Proof: We first proceed with the case where q(0) is
contained in F and show that F is a positively invariant set
of (70). By contradiction, suppose that there is time indices
t0, t1 for which q(t0) ∈ F and q(t) /∈ F for all t ∈ (t0, t1].
Let us define a piecewise constant function by
vK(t)
def
= v
(
t0 +
k − 1
K
(t1 − t0)
)
if t ∈ (t0 + k−1K (t1 − t0), t0 + kK (t1 − t0)] for each k in{1, · · · ,K}. Using the function vK(t), we define the follow-
ing:
qK(t1) = e
−α(t1−t0)b0
+ α
K∑
k=1
∫ t0+ kK (t1−t0)
t0+
k−1
K (t1−t0)
e−α(t1−τ) dτ bk (71)
where b0 = q(t0) ∈ F and bk = v
(
t0 +
k−1
K (t1 − t0)
) ∈
F for k in {1, · · · ,K}. Note that since qK(t1) is a convex
combination of {bk}Kk=0, it holds that qK(t1) ∈ F. Using the
fact that limK→∞ ‖qK(t1)−q(t1)‖ = 0, we have that q(t1) ∈
F, which contradicts the hypothesis that q(t) /∈ F for all t ∈
(t0, t1].
Now consider that q(0) is not necessarily contained in F.
By explicitly writing a solution to (70), we can derive the
following expression:
q(t) = e−αtq(0) + α
∫ t
0
e−α(t−τ)v(τ) dτ
= q¯(t) + e−αt (q(0)− q¯(0)) (72)
where q¯(t) = e−αtq¯(0)+α
∫ t
0
e−α(t−τ)v(τ) dτ with q¯(0) ∈ F.
Since the second term in (72) vanishes as t → ∞, based on
the positive invariance of F, we conclude that
lim
t→∞
(
inf
s∈F
‖q(t)− s‖
)
≤ lim
t→∞ ‖q(t)− q¯(t)‖ = 0 (73)
A. Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2
a) Proof of Lemma 1: Recall that under Case I, since the
δ-storage function S is informative, we have that
∇Tz S (z, r)V (z, r) = 0 =⇒ S (z, r) = 0 (74)
Also, using Lemma 3, we note that under Case II the following
relation is true:
∇Tz S (z, r)V (z, r) + ν∗VT (z, r)V (z, r)
≤ −(η∗ − ν∗)VT (z, r)V (z, r) ≤ 0 (75)
Since S is informative, we have that
∇Tz S (z, r)V (z, r) + ν∗VT (x, p)V (z, r) = 0
=⇒ S (z, r) = 0 (76)
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Hence, under either Case I (ν∗ = 0) or Case II (ν∗ > 0),
according to (74) and (76), we can see that
∇Tz S (z, r)V (z, r) + ν∗VT (z, r)V (z, r) = 0
=⇒ S (z, r) = 0 (77)
In what follows, using (77), we prove the statement of the
lemma. We proceed with defining an open set given by O
def
=
{t > 0 ∣∣S(x(t), p(t)) > 2} for a given state trajectory (x, p)
and any constant  > 0. According to (77) and Remark 1,
there exists δ1 > 0 for which the following holds for all t in
O:
∇TxS(x(t), p(t))V(x(t), p(t))
+ ν∗VT (x(t), p(t))V(x(t), p(t)) ≤ −δ1 (78)
Note that using (20), we can derive the following relations:
S(x(t), p(t))− S(x(0), p(0))−A(q(0), ‖x˙‖)
≤
∫ t
0
[
d
dτ
S(x(τ), p(τ))
− p˙T (τ)x˙(τ) + ν∗x˙T (τ)x˙(τ)
]
dτ
=
∫ t
0
[
∇TxS(x(τ), p(τ))V(x(τ), p(τ))
+ ν∗VT (x(τ), p(τ))V(x(τ), p(τ))
]
dτ (79)
where we use the fact that ∇rS(z, r) = V(z, r) (see
Lemma 3). Since S is a non-negative function, we can infer
that (79) is lower-bounded by −S(x(0), p(0))−A(q(0), ‖x˙‖)
for t ≥ 0. In conjunction with (78), this yields that
− S(x(0), p(0))−A(q(0), ‖x˙‖)
≤
∫ ∞
0
[
∇TxS(x(τ), p(τ))V(x(τ), p(τ))
+ ν∗VT (x(τ), p(τ))V(x(τ), p(τ))
]
dτ
≤
∫
O
[
∇TxS(x(τ), p(τ))V(x(τ), p(τ))
+ ν∗VT (x(τ), p(τ))V(x(τ), p(τ))
]
dτ
≤ −δ1 · L (O) (80)
where L (O) is the Lebesgue measure of O. Hence, we have
that L (O) ≤ δ−11 (S(x(0), p(0)) + A(q(0), ‖x˙‖)). Note that
since x ∈ X, L(O) is bounded.
We can represent the open set O as a union of disjoint
open intervals {Ii}∞i=1, i.e., O =
⋃∞
i=1 Ii. Notice that by
our construction of O, by letting Ii = (ai, bi), we have
that S(x(ai), p(ai)) ≤ 2 and S(x(t), p(t)) > 2 for all t
in Ii. Since O has finite Lebesgue measure, it holds that
limi→∞ L (Ii) = 0.
In what follows, we show that for each  > 0, there exists
T > 0 for which S(x(t), p(t)) <  holds for all t ≥ T, and
we conclude that limt→∞ S(x(t), p(t)) = 0. By contradiction,
suppose that there exist a constant  > 0 and an infinite
subsequence {Ij}j∈J of {Ii}∞i=1 for which the following holds:
For every j in J,
max
t∈cl(Ij)
S(x(t), p(t)) ≥ 
where cl (Ij) is the closure of Ij . Let tj ∈ cl (Ij) be for which
the following holds:
S(x(tj), p(tj)) = max
t∈cl(Ij)
S(x(t), p(t))
By letting Ij = (aj , bj), we can derive the following:
S(x(tj), p(tj))− S(x(aj), p(aj))
=
∫ tj
aj
d
dτ
S(x(τ), p(τ)) dτ
(i)
≤
∫ tj
aj
p˙T (τ)V(x(τ), p(τ)) dτ
(ii)
≤ δ2L (Ij) (81)
The inequality (i) can be derived using the facts that
∇TxS(x(t), p(t))V(x(t), p(t)) ≤ 0 and ∇pS(x(t), p(t)) =
V(x(t), p(t)) (see Lemma 3). To see that (ii) holds, recall
that p and p˙ are both bounded (see Remark 1), and hence
by the Lipschitz continuity of V (see Definition 7), there is
δ2 > 0 for which p˙T (τ)V(x(τ), p(τ)) ≤ δ2 holds for τ ≥ 0.
This immediately yields (ii).
Since S(x(aj), p(aj)) ≤ 2 for every j in J and
limj→∞ L (Ij) = 0, from (81), we can see that
S(x(tj), p(tj)) <  for sufficiently large j in J. This con-
tradicts the hypothesis that S(x(tj), p(tj)) ≥  holds for all
j in J. Hence, we can infer that, for each  > 0, there exists
T > 0 for which S(x(t), p(t)) < , ∀t ≥ T from which we
conclude that limt→∞ S(x(t), p(t)) = 0. 
b) Proof of Lemma 2: Since the EDM is Nash stationary
and has an informative δ-storage function S, according to
Lemma 4, the following relations hold:
S(z, r) = 0 ⇐⇒ V(z, r) = 0
⇐⇒ z ∈ arg max
z¯∈X
z¯T r (82)
Using Lemma 1, we have that
lim
t→∞S(x(t), p(t)) = 0 (83)
According to Remark 1, without loss of generality, we
may assume that there is a positive constant ρ for which
the deterministic payoff p(t) satisfies ‖p(t)‖ ≤ ρ, t ≥ 0,
and we define the set of stationary points of the EDM as
S = {(z, r) ∈ X× Rn | z ∈ arg maxz¯∈X z¯T r and ‖r‖ ≤ 2ρ}.
Note that S is a closed set, and hence it is compact.
By (82), (83), and Remark 1, it holds that
lim
t→∞
(
inf
(z,r)∈S
[‖x(t)− z‖+ ‖p(t)− r‖]
)
= 0 (84)
lim
t→∞ ‖x˙(t)‖ = 0 (85)
and in conjunction with Assumption 2, we have that
lim
t→∞ ‖p(t)− F¯(x(t))‖ = 0 (86)
Also note that in conjunction with (84)-(86), using the fact
that
(z, F¯(z)) ∈ S ⇐⇒ z ∈ NE(F¯) (87)
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we can derive the following inequality:
lim
t→∞
(
inf
(z,r)∈S
[‖x(t)− z‖+ ‖F¯(x(t))− r‖])
≤ lim
t→∞
(
inf
(z,r)∈S
[‖x(t)− z‖+ ‖p(t)− r‖]
)
+ lim
t→∞ ‖p(t)− F¯(x(t))‖ = 0 (88)
To show global attractiveness of NE(F¯), in what follows,
we prove that (88) yields
lim
t→∞
(
inf
(z,F¯(z))∈S
[‖x(t)− z‖+ ‖F¯(x(t))− F¯(z)‖]) = 0
(89)
and we conclude that
lim
t→∞ infz∈NE(F¯)
‖x(t)− z‖
= lim
t→∞ inf(z,F¯(z))∈S
‖x(t)− z‖
≤ lim
t→∞
(
inf
(z,F¯(z))∈S
[‖x(t)− z‖+ ‖F¯(x(t))− F¯(z)‖]) = 0
(90)
By contradiction, suppose that there is a sequence of
increasing time indices {tn}∞n=1 for which the sequence
{x(tn)}∞n=1 converges and it holds that
lim
n→∞
(
inf
(z,r)∈S
[‖x(tn)− z‖+ ‖F¯(x(tn))− r‖]) = 0 (91)
but
lim
n→∞
(
inf
(z,F¯(z))∈S
[‖x(tn)− z‖+ ‖F¯(x(tn))− F¯(z)‖]) > 0
(92)
Since S is compact, there is a converging sequence
{(zn, rn)}∞n=1 for which its limit point (z∗, r∗) is contained
in S and it holds that
‖x∗ − z∗‖+ ‖F¯(x∗)− r∗‖ = 0 (93)
where x∗ is the limit of {x(tn)}∞n=1. Hence, we have that
(x∗, F¯(x∗)) ∈ S.
On the other hand, by a similar argument, from (92), we can
show that x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium. This is a contradiction
and proves that NE(F¯) is globally attractive.
In what follows, we prove Lyapunov stability of NE(F¯).
Recall that if the PDM is δ-antipassive, there is a continuously
differentiable map L : X×Rn → R+ for which the following
two relations are true:
L(z, s) = 0 ⇐⇒ H(s, z) = F¯(z) (94)
d
dt
L(x(t), q(t)) ≤ −p˙T (t)x˙(t) (95)
In conjunction with (82) and Lemma 3, using (94) and (95),
we have that
S(z,H(s, z)) + L(z, s) = 0
⇐⇒ H(s, z) = F¯(z) and z ∈ NE(F¯) (96)
d
dt
[S(x(t),H(q(t), x(t))) + L(x(t), q(t))] ≤ 0 (97)
Let A be a subset of X× Rn defined by
A =
{
(z, s) ∈ X× Rn ∣∣S(z,H(s, z)) + L(z, s) = 0}
Note that according to Assumption 2, the set A is a compct
subset or F× Rn, where the set F is given by
F = {z ∈ X ∣∣S(z, F¯(z)) = 0}
Let O be a given open set containing A. For the former
case, without loss of generality, suppose that O is bounded;
otherwise, we can select a bounded open set V containing A
and proceed with the intersection O∩V. Define a constant α
as α = min(z,s)∈bd(O)∩(X×Rn) [S(z,H(s, z)) + L(z, s)].
With a constant β satisfying α > β > 0,
we consider an open set defined by Oβ ={
(z, s) ∈ O ∩ (X× Rn) ∣∣S(z,H(s, z)) + L(z, s) < β}. Note
that since ddt [S(x(t),H(q(t), x(t))) + L(x(t), q(t))] ≤ 0,
any trajectory starting from Oβ should remain in O;
otherwise, there should exist a time index t1 for which
S(x(t1),H(q(t1), x(t1))) + L(x(t1), q(t1)) ≥ α > β holds,
which is a contradiction.
For the later case, the set O can be written as O =
U × Rn where U is an open set containing F. Without
loss of generality, we assume that U is a bounded subset
of Rn; otherwise, we can select a bounded open set V
containing F and proceed the proof with the intersection
U ∩ V. Define α = minz∈bd(U)∩X S(z, F¯(z)). With a con-
stant β satisfying α > β > 0, we consider an open set
defined by Uβ =
{
z ∈ U ∣∣S(z, F¯(z)) < β}. Note that since
d
dtS(x(t), F¯(x(t))) ≤ 0, any trajectory starting from Uβ
should remain in U; otherwise, there should exist a time index
t1 > 0 for which S(x(t1), F¯(x(t1))) ≥ α > β holds, which
is a contradiction. This completes the proof of lemma. 
B. Proofs of Propositions 3 and 5, and Theorem 3
a) Proof of Proposition 3: We first note that the acute-
ness condition (27) implies the so-called Positive Correlation
[58] which is described as follows:
V(z, r) 6= 0 =⇒ rTV(z, r) > 0 (98)
where V is a map defined by the protocol T EPT as in
Definition 8.
Let IEPT be a continuously differentiable function satisfying
(28). It can be verified that the gradients of IEPT with respect
to r and z, respectively, satisfy
∇rIEPT(rˆ) = V(z, r) (99a)
∇Tz IEPT(rˆ)V(z, r) = −
(
rTV(z, r)) n∑
i=1
T EPTi (rˆ) (99b)
Let us select a candidate δ-storage function as SEPT(z, r) =
IEPT(rˆ) − γ for some constant γ. Due to (99a), the func-
tion SEPT satisfies (67a). In conjunction with the fact that
T EPT(rˆ) = 0 implies V(z, r) = 0, due to (98) and (99b),
we can see that (67b) holds with η = 0 and the equality in
(67b) holds only if V(z, r) = 0.
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Suppose that IEPT also satisfies the following inequality for
every rˆ in Rn∗ :
IEPT(rˆ) ≥ IEPT(0) (100)
Then by defining γ = IEPT(0), we conclude that IEPT(rˆ)− γ
is non-negative.
Based on the aforementioned arguments and Lemma 3, the
EPT EDM is δ-passive with a δ-storage function given by
SEPT(z, r) = IEPT(rˆ) − IEPT(0). In addition, in conjunction
with Remark 5 and Lemma 4, we conclude that SEPT is
informative and (30) holds. In what follows, we show that
(100) is valid for every rˆ in Rn∗ .
We first claim that (100) holds for all (z, r) in the set SEPT
of stationary points of the EPT EDM. By (99a), for fixed z in
X, the following equality holds for all r in Rn:
IEPT (rˆ)− IEPT (0) =
∫ 1
0
rTV(z, σr) dσ (101)
where rˆi = ri − 1m
∑n
i=1 rizi. Since the EPT EDM is Nash
stationary (see Remark 5), (z, r) ∈ SEPT implies (z, σr) ∈
SEPT for all σ in [0, 1), and by (101), for each (z, r) in SEPT,
we have that
IEPT(rˆ) = IEPT(0) (102)
Since (102) holds for every (z, r) in SEPT, this proves the
claim.
To see that (100) extends to the entire domain X×Rn, by
contradiction, let us assume that there is (z′, r′) /∈ SEPT for
which SEPT(z′, r′) + γ = IEPT(rˆ′) < IEPT(0) holds, where
rˆ′i = r
′
i− 1m
∑n
i=1 r
′
iz
′
i. Let x(t) be the mean population state
induced by the EPT EDM with the initial condition x(0) = z′
and the constant deterministic payoff p(t) = r′, t ≥ 0. By (98)
and (99b), the value of SEPT(x(t), p(t)) is strictly decreasing
unless V(x(t), p(t)) = 0. By the hypothesis that SEPT(z′, r′)+
γ < IEPT(0) and by (102), for every (z, r) in SEPT, it holds
that SEPT(z′, r′) < SEPT(z, r) and the state (x(t), p(t)) never
converges to SEPT. On the other hand, by LaSalle’s Theorem
[19], since p(t) is constant and the mean population state
x(t) is contained in a compact set, x(t) converges to an
invariant subset of
{
z ∈ X ∣∣∇Tz SEPT(z, r′)V(z, r′) = 0}. By
(98) and (99b), the invariant subset is contained in SEPT. This
contradicts the previous argument that the state (x(t), p(t))
does not converge to SEPT. This proves that IEPT(rˆ) ≥ IEPT(0)
holds for all (z, r) in X× Rn. 
b) Proof of Proposition 5: The analysis used in [61,
Theorem 2.1] suggests that the following hold: For all r in
Rn, z in X, and z˜ in TX,
z˜T∇r
[
max
z¯∈int(X)
(rT z¯ −Q(z¯))
]
= z˜TMQ(r) (103a)
z˜T∇Q(z) = z˜T r if and only if z =MQ(r) (103b)
Using (103), we can see that
∇rSPBR(z, r) =MQ(r)− z = V˜Q(z, r) (104)
and
∇Tz SPBR(z, r)V˜Q(z, r) = − (r −∇Q(z))T V˜Q(z, r)
= − (∇Q(w)−∇Q(z))T (w − z)
(105)
where w = MQ(r). By the fact that Q is strictly con-
vex, it holds that ∇Tz SPBR(z, r)V˜Q(z, r) ≤ 0 where the
equality holds only if V˜Q(z, r) = 0, which is equivalent to
SPBR(z, r) = 0. By Lemma 3 and Remark 8, the PBR EDM
is δ-passive and SPBR is an associated informative δ-storage
function. This proves Case I.
Furthermore, if the perturbation Q satisfies z˜T∇2Q(z)z˜ ≥
η∗z˜T z˜ for all z ∈ X, z˜ ∈ TX, i.e., Q is strongly
convex, then it holds that (∇Q(w)−∇Q(z))T (w − z) ≥
η∗ ‖w − z‖2 for all w, z in X. Using (105) we can de-
rive ∇Tz SPBR(z, r)V˜Q(z, r) ≤ −η∗V˜Q(z, r)T V˜Q(z, r). By
Lemma 3 and Remark 8, the PBR EDM is δ-passive with
surplus η∗ and SPBR is an associated informative δ-storage
function. This proves Case II. 
c) Proof of Theorem 3: We proceed with recalling that
according to Proposition 5, SPBR given in (49) is an informa-
tive δ-storage function of the PBR EDM and satisfies
SPBR(z, r) = 0 ⇐⇒ V˜Q(z, r) = 0
⇐⇒ z = arg max
z¯∈int(X)
(z¯T r −Q(z¯)) (106)
According to Remark 1, without loss of generality, we
may assume that there is a positive constant ρ for which the
deterministic payoff p(t) satisfies ‖p(t)‖ ≤ ρ, and we define
the set of stationary points of the PBR EDM as
SPBR =
{
(z, r) ∈ int(X)× Rn ∣∣ z = arg max
z¯∈int(X)
(z¯T r −Q(z¯))
and ‖r‖ ≤ 2ρ}
Based on the analysis used in [61, Theorem 2.1], if (z, r) ∈
SPBR then z˜T∇Q(z) = z˜T r holds for all z˜ ∈ TX. In addition
since r is bounded, from (41), we conclude that any sequence
{(zn, rn)}∞n=1 ⊂ SPBR has accumulation points that belong to
SPBR, which shows that SPBR is a compact set.
Using Lemma 1, the rest of the proof on establishing
global attractiveness and Lyapunov stability of PE(F¯ ,Q) is
analogous to the arguments used in the proof of Lemma 2. 
C. Proof of Propositions 7 and 9
a) Proof of Proposition 7: In order to prove i), ii), and
iii) we need to establish that the PDM satisfies the weak δ-
antipassivity condition (20).
We start by using the linear superposition principle to
write the solution of (53) as p = ph + pf , where ph is the
solution assuming that u˙ is zero and pf assumes that u(0) = 0,
p(0) = 0, and r¯ = 0. Namely, pf captures the effect of u˙ and
ph is the solution of the initial value problem with respect to
given u(0), p(0), and r¯. We proceed with analyzing the two
terms on the right-hand side below:∫ t
0
u˙T (τ)p˙(τ)dτ =
∫ t
0
u˙T (τ)p˙f (τ) dτ +
∫ t
0
u˙T (τ)p˙h(τ) dτ
(107)
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The explicit solution for the homogeneous part gives
p˙h(t) = (αµ1 − α2µ2)e−αt
(
Fu(0) + r¯ − q(0)). In particular,
the following inequality holds:∫ t
0
u˙T (τ)p˙h(τ) dτ ≤ A(q(0), ‖u˙‖), q(0) ∈ Rn, u ∈ X
(108)
where the map A : Rn × R+ → R+ can be chosen as:
A(q(0), ‖u˙‖) = |µ1 − µ2α|‖u˙‖
(
‖r¯ − q(0)‖+ max
z∈X
‖Fz‖
)
(109)
We now proceed with showing that i) and ii) hold by deter-
mining when the following inequality is satisfied:∫ t
0
u˙T (τ)p˙f (τ) dτ ≤ λ∗
∫ t
0
u˙T (τ)u˙(τ) dτ, t ≥ 0, u ∈ X
(110)
Here, we can use the fact that the map from u˙ to p˙f is linear
time invariant and characterized by the transfer function matrix
α+µ¯s
α+s F , where s is the complex Laplace variable and µ¯ is
defined as µ0 + αµ2. At this point we can use Parseval’s
Theorem, which guarantees that (110) holds if the following
inequality is satisfied:
zH
(
α+ µ¯jω
α+ jω
F +
α− µ¯jω
α− jω F
T
)
z ≤ 2λ∗zHz,
ω ∈ R, z ∈ TC (111)
where H represents the Hermitian operator (transpose conju-
gate) and TC def= {z ∈ Cn|∑ni=1 zi = 0}. Since (α + jω) is
nonzero for all real ω, we can re-state the condition as follows:
zH(α2 + µ¯ω2 + jω(µ¯α− α))Fz+
zH(α2 + µ¯ω2 − jω(µ¯α− α))FT z ≤
2λ∗(α2 + ω2)zHz,
ω ∈ R, z ∈ TC (112)
Rearranging terms leads to yet another equivalent inequality:
(α2 + µ¯ω2)zH(F + FT )z+
jω(µ¯α− α)zH(F − FT )z ≤
2λ∗(α2 + ω2)zHz,
ω ∈ R, z ∈ TC (113)
Now, notice that because the statement of the proposition
requires ΦFΦ to be symmetric, the second term of the left-
hand side above vanishes and the inequality becomes:
zTFz ≤ λ∗ α
2 + ω2
α2 + µ¯ω2
zT z, ω ∈ R, z ∈ TX (114)
Notice that above we no longer need to consider z in TC.
More specifically, we can simply restrict z to TX because
otherwise the imaginary components of z would cancel out.
The proof for i) and ii) is concluded once we realize that if
λ∗ = 0 or λ∗ > 0 and µ¯ ≤ 1 then the inequality above is
satisfied. In order to show that iii) is also true, we need to
determine when the following inequality holds:∫ t
0
u˙T (τ)p˙f (τ) dτ ≤ µ¯λ∗
∫ t
0
u˙T (τ)u˙(τ) dτ, t ≥ 0, u ∈ X
(115)
By proceeding in a way that is analogous to our proof of i)
and ii), we can show that (115) is equivalent to:
zTFz ≤ µ¯λ∗ α
2 + ω2
α2 + µ¯ω2
zT z, ω ∈ R, z ∈ TX (116)
The proof of iii) is concluded once we realize that if λ∗ > 0
and µ¯ > 1 then the inequality above holds. 
b) Proof of Proposition 9: Define f∗ as the Legendre
conjugate of f given by
f∗(s) def= sup
y∈Rn
(f(y)− sT y)
Note that D∗ is the domain of f∗ and its interior int(D∗) is
an open convex set.
We first show that, for any u ∈ X, the set int(D∗) is
positively invariant, i.e., q(t) ∈ int(D∗), ∀t ≥ 0. Let F be a
closed convex subset of int(D∗) containing Im(F) and q(0).
Based on Lemma 5, we can infer that q(t) ∈ F ⊂ int(D∗) for
all t ≥ 0. This proves the positive invariance of int(D∗).
Note that it follows from continuous differentiability of f
and [66, Theorem 26.5] that L is also continuously differen-
tiable. Hence, to show δ-antipassivity of the PDM, according
to Definition 14, it suffices to show that
L(z, s) = 0 ⇐⇒ F(z) = s (117)
holds for all z and s in X and Rn, respectively, and
d
dt
L(u, q) ≤ −p˙T u˙ (118)
holds for all q(0) in int(D∗) and u in X.
To see that (117) is valid, note that the function L is defined
over Rn × Rn and L(z, s) = 0 implies ∇zL(z, s) = 0
which, according to (62), ensures that F(z) = s. Conversely,
if F(z) = s then, by strict concavity of f , it holds that
supy∈Rn(f(y) − sT y) = f(z) − sT z, which ensures that
L(z, s) = 0.
To show (118), we compute the time-derivative of (62) as
follows:
d
dt
L(u, q) = ∇TuL(u, q)u˙+∇Tq L(u, q)q˙
= −p˙T u˙+ α2(∇f∗(q) + u)T (F(u)− q)
(i)
= −p˙T u˙+ α2(u− v)T (∇f(u)−∇f(v))
(ii)
≤ −p˙T u˙
where to derive (i) and (ii), we use strict concavity of f ,
the positive invariance of int(D∗), and [66, Theorem 26.5] to
show that q = ∇f(v) whenever ∇f∗(q) = −v. 
REFERENCES
[1] W. H. Sandholm, Handbook of game theory, vol. 4, ch. Population games
and deterministic evolutionary dynamics, pp. 703–775. North Holland,
2015.
[2] W. H. Sandholm, Population games and evolutionary dynamics. MIT
Press, 2010.
[3] J. W. Weibull, Evolutionary game theory. MIT Press, 1995.
[4] L. E. Blume, The economy as an evolving complex system II, ch. Pop-
ulation games. CRC press, 2018.
[5] M. Beckmann, C. B. McGuire, and C. C. Koopmans, Studies in the
economics of transportation. Research in economics at Yale University,
Cowles Foundation, January 1956.
25
[6] Y. Sheffi, Urban transportation networks. Prentice Hall, 1985.
[7] D. T. Bishop and C. Cannings, “A generalized war of attrition,” Journal
of theoretical biology, vol. 70, pp. 85–124, 1978.
[8] J. W. Weibull, “The mass-action interpretation of Nash equilibrium,”
No. 427 in Working paper series, 1995.
[9] J. F. Nash Jr., “Non-cooperative games,” Annals of mathematics second
series, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 286–295, 1951.
[10] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, The theory of evolution and dynamical
systems. Cambridge University press, 1988.
[11] W. H. Sandholm, “Pairwise comparison dynamics and evolutionary
foundations for Nash equilibrium,” Games, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 3–17, 2010.
[12] P. D. Taylor and L. B. Jonker, “Evolutionarily stable strategies and games
dynamics,” Mathematical Biosciences, vol. 40, pp. 145–156, 1978.
[13] J. Maynard Smith and G. R. Price, “The logic of animal conflict,” Nature,
vol. 246, no. November, pp. 15–18, 1973.
[14] D. Foster and P. Young, “Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics,”
Theoretical population biology, vol. 38, pp. 219–232, 1990.
[15] M. Kandori, G. J. Mailath, and R. Rob, “Learning, mutation, and long
run equilibria in games,” Econometrica, vol. 61, pp. 29–56, January
1993.
[16] W. H. Sandholm, “Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information,”
Games and economic behavior, vol. 44, pp. 343–378, August 2003.
[17] M. Benaı¨m and J. Weibull, “Deterministic approximation of stochastic
evolution in games,” Econometrica, vol. 71, no. 3, pp. 873–903, 2003.
[18] T. G. Kurtz, “Solutions of ordinary differential equations as limits of
pure jump Markov processes,” Journal of applied probability, vol. 7,
pp. 49–58, April 1970.
[19] H. K. Khalil, Nonlinear systems. Prentice Hall, 1995.
[20] J. Hofbauer, “From Nash and Brown to Maynard Smith: equilibria,
dynamics and ess,” Selection, vol. 1, no. 81-88, 2000.
[21] W. H. Sandholm, “Potential games with continuous player sets,” Journal
of economic theory, vol. 97, pp. 81–108, 2001.
[22] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley, “Potential games,” Games and economic
behavior, vol. 14, pp. 124–143, 1996.
[23] J. Hofbauer and W. H. Sandholm, “Stable games,” in Proceedings of the
IEEE conference on decision and control, pp. 3416–3421, 2007.
[24] J. Hofbauer and W. H. Sandholm, “Stable games and their dynamics,”
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 144, pp. 1665–1693.e4, July 2009.
[25] M. Benaı¨m, “Recursive algorithms, urn processes, and the chaining
number of chain recurrent sets,” Ergodic theory and dynamic processes,
vol. 18, pp. 53–87, 1998.
[26] M. Benaı¨m and M. W. Hirsch, “Stochastic approximation algorithms
with constant step size whose average is cooperative,” Journal of applied
probability, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 216–241, 1999.
[27] W. J. Rugh, Linear System Theory (2Nd Ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ,
USA: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1996.
[28] M. J. Fox and J. S. Shamma, “Population games, stable games, and
passivity,” Games, vol. 4, pp. 561–583, 2013.
[29] J. P. Lasalle, “Some extensions of Liapunov’s second method,” IRE
transactions on circuit theory, vol. 7, pp. 520–527, December 1960.
[30] M. Arcak, C. Meissen, and A. Packard, “Networks of dissipative dys-
tems: compositional certification of stability, performance, and safety,”
in Springer briefs in electrical and computer engineering : control,
automation and robotics, Springer, 2016.
[31] J. C. Willems, “Dissipative dynamical systems part i: general theory,”
Archive for rational mechanics and analysis, vol. 45, pp. 321–351,
January 1972.
[32] R. Sepulchre, M. Jankovic´, and P. Kokotovic´, Constructive nonlinear
control. Springer, 1997.
[33] F. Forni and R. Sepulchre, “A differential Lyapunov framework for
contraction analysis,” IEEE transactions on automatic control, vol. 59,
pp. 614–628, March 2014.
[34] F. Forni and R. Sepulchre, “On differentially dissipative dynamical
systems,” in Proceedings of the 9th IFAC Symposium on Nonlinear
Control Systems, 2013.
[35] A. Pavlov and L. Marconi, “Incremental passivity and output regulation,”
Systems and control letters, vol. 57, pp. 400–409, 2008.
[36] S. Park, Distributed estimation and stability of evolutionary game
dynamics with applications to study of animal motion. PhD thesis,
University of Maryland, December 2015.
[37] S. Park, J. S. Shamma, and N. C. Martins, “Passivity and evolutionary
game dynamics (arxiv:1803.07744 ).” arXiv.org, March 2018.
[38] S. Park, J. S. Shamma, and N. C. Martins, “Passivity and evolutionary
game dynamics,” in Proceedings of the IEEE conference on decision
and control (CDC), 2018.
[39] B. Farkas and S.-A. Wegner, “Variations on Barba
¯
lat’s lemma,” The
American Mathematical Monthly, vol. 123, pp. 825–830, October 2016.
[40] M. J. Smith, “The stability of a dynamic model of traffic assignment: an
application of a method of Lyapunov,” Transportation science, vol. 18,
pp. 245–252, August 1984.
[41] J. G. Wardrop, “Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research,”
Proceedings of the institution of civil engineers, vol. 1, pp. 325–362,
May 1952.
[42] N. Quijano, C. Ocampo-Martinez, J. Barreiro-Gomez, G. Obando,
A. Pantoja, and E. Mojica-Nava, “The role of population games and
evolutionary dynamics in distributed control systems,” IEEE Control
Systems Magazine, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 70–97, 2017.
[43] H. Tembine, E. Altman, R. El-Azouri, and Y. Hayel, “Evolutionary
games in wireless networks,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and
Cybernetics, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 634–646, 2010.
[44] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, “Evolutionary game dynamics,” Bulletin
of the American mathematical society, vol. 40, pp. 479–519, July 2003.
[45] T. L. Vincent, “The evolution of ess theory,” Annual Review of Ecology,
Evolution, and Systematics, vol. 19, pp. 423–443, 1988.
[46] T. L. Vincent and T. L. S. Vincent, “Evolution and control system
design,” IEEE Control Systems Magazine, vol. 20, pp. 30–35, October
2000.
[47] D. A. Gomes, L. Nurbekyan, and E. A. Pimentel, “Economic models
and mean-field games theory,” in 30th Colo´qui Brasileiro de matema´tica,
Publica co˜es matema´ticas, IMPA, 2015.
[48] M. Huang, P. Caines, and R. Malhame, “Large-population cost-coupled
lqg problems with nonuniform agents: individual-mass behavior and de-
centralized -Nash equilibria,” IEEE Transactions on automatic control,
vol. 52, pp. 1560–1571, October 2007.
[49] M. Huang, R. Malhame, and P. E. Caines, “The nce (mean field)
principle with locality dependent cost interactions,” IEEE transactions
on automatic control, vol. 55, no. 12, pp. 2799–2805, 2010.
[50] J.-M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions, “Mean field games,” Japanese Journal of
Mathematics, vol. 2, pp. 229–260, March 2007.
[51] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game theory. The MIT Press, 1991.
[52] A. Mahajan, N. C. Martins, M. C. Rotkowitz, and S. Yuksel, “Informa-
tion structures in optimal decentralized control,” in Proceedings of the
IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, pp. 1291–1306, 2012.
[53] M. Aziz and P. E. Caines, “A mean field game computational methodol-
ogy for decentralized cellular network optimization,” IEEE transactions
on control systems technology, vol. 25, pp. 563–576, March 2017.
[54] P. J. Moylan, “Implications of passivity in a class of nonlinear systems,”
IEEE Transactions on automatic control, vol. 19, pp. 373–381, August
1974.
[55] D. Hill and P. J. Moylan, “The stability of nonlinear dissipative systems,”
IEEE transactions on automatic control, vol. 21, pp. 708–711, October
1976.
[56] G. H. Hines, M. Arcak, and A. K. Packard, “Equilibrium-independent
passivity: a new definition and numerical certification,” Automatica,
vol. 47, pp. 1949–1956, 2011.
[57] B. Gao and L. Pavel, “On passivity and reinforcement learning in finite
games,” in 2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC),
pp. 340–345, Dec 2018.
[58] W. H. Sandholm, “Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved
evolutionary dynamics,” Journal of economic theory, vol. 124, no. 2,
pp. 149–170, 2005.
[59] G. W. Brown and J. von Neumann, “Solutions of games by differential
equations,” tech. rep., RAND corporation, April 1950.
[60] J. Hofbauer and W. H. Sandholm, “Evolution in games with randomly
disturbed payoffs,” Journal of economic theory, vol. 132, no. 1, pp. 47–
69, 2007.
[61] J. Hofbauer and W. H. Sandholm, “On the global convergence of
stochastic fictitious play,” Econometrica, vol. 70, no. 6, pp. 2265–2294,
2002.
[62] D. Fudenberg and D. M. Kreps, “Learning mixed equilibria,” Games
and economic behavior, vol. 5, pp. 320–367, July 1993.
[63] J. S. Shamma and G. Arslan, “Dynamic fictitious play, dynamic gradient
play, and distributed convergence to Nash equilibria,” IEEE transactions
on automatic control, vol. 50, 2005.
[64] G. Arslan and J. S. Shamma, “Anticipatory learning in general evolu-
tionary games,” in Proceedings of the IEEE conference on decision and
control (CDC), pp. 6289–6294, 2006.
[65] G. C. Chasparis and J. S. Shamma, “Distributed dynamic reinforcement
of efficient outcomes in multiagent coordination and network formation,”
Dynamic games and applications, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 18–50, 2012.
[66] R. T. Rockafellar, Convex analysis. Princeton University press, 1996.
